TREAD ON ME!
Toni M. Massaro∗
“If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official,
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their
faith therein.”
Justice Robert H. Jackson
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ABSTRACT
Freedom of speech doctrine is an analytical and theoretical morass. This is primarily because
expression is a ubiquitous human activity that government regulates in ways that defy simple
summary.
Yet despite the complexity and vast scope of the modern freedom of expression terrain,
commentators and courts strain to identify unifying, formalistic analytical principles and to
propose singular theoretical prisms through which to view the terrain. I argue that this is a wrong
turn. A better understanding of past and present free speech practice requires thinking that is
factored, not formulaic; contextual, not trans-contextual; dynamic, not static; tentative, not
absolutist; plural, not singular or even dichotomous. In fact, nuance will be increasingly
important in future First Amendment cases, as new science, new technologies, and socio-political
developments challenge fundamental assumptions that undergird the doctrine. This is especially
apparent when one confronts the free speech canard that government cannot compel private
expression.
This Article proceeds in two parts.
Part I describes in broad strokes the current state of doctrinal and theoretical affairs in the free
speech realm. It offers a topography of the free speech doctrinal terrain and identifies key questions
that pervade it. This section focuses in particular on the significance of “above-the-line” treatment
of speech regulations that trigger elevated scrutiny. This overview shows that the doctrine offers, at
most, a set of norms and questions that inform judicial analysis rather than a “fixed star” or even
fixed principles.
Part II critiques three recent Roberts Court decisions that ignore this doctrinal reality. The Court
∗
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has insisted that speaker identity distinctions always trigger elevated scrutiny, that only traditional
and historical categorical exceptions are constitutional, and that government speech is beyond the
freedom of speech principles. None of these formalistic statements can be squared with other free
speech doctrine, significant zones of traditional government regulation, or common sense. They
also weaken the Court’s ability to balance the conflicting policy concerns that arise in a host of
speech-sensitive areas—such regulation of data collection, licensed professionals, or other
commercial actors.
That the Court’s more rigid approach to free speech is unsustainable is especially apparent if one
examines the compelled speech cases. Contrary to Justice Robert Jackson’s rhetorically arresting “no
fixed star” celebration of individual freedom from compulsory pledges of allegiance, government
often demands private expression, crafts it, or silences it altogether. Government can, and often
does, “tread on me.” Constitutionally mandated oaths of office, occupation-specific codes of
conduct, public accommodations laws, audience and context-specific regulation of the content of
information disclosures, many employment and civil rights statutes, student conduct codes,
conditions on government benefits, anti-fraud laws, and many other forms of government speech
regulation demonstrate that there is no across-the-board constitutional mandate against
government compelled expression. In all of these cases, context, history and a host of relevant
government interests matter.
In 2013, the Roberts Court struck down a condition on a government grant that it deemed
unduly coercive of grantees’ freedom of expression. Yet the Court also recognized that contextual
flexibility matters in determining when funding conditions go beyond sensible restrictions and
become unlawful compulsion. I praise this recent turn away from free speech formalism, and
suggest this not only is the better analytical approach in compelled speech cases, but in free speech
cases more generally.

INTRODUCTION
The basic tenets of modern free speech doctrine are as follows:
content-based government regulation of expression triggers exacting
scrutiny and is presumptively unconstitutional. Prior restraints are a
worst case scenario. Content-neutral regulations trigger intermediate
scrutiny. Expressive conduct walks an uneasy line between speech
and non-speech, but even government regulations aimed at the conduct component of expressive behavior may trigger intermediate
scrutiny.
Enormously significant caveats to the basic rules nearly swallow
2
these tenets. Categorical exceptions, such as “fighting words,” carve
impressive holes into the free speech edifice. Most government space
is “non-public,” and private speech may be heavily restricted or
banned altogether there. Perhaps most importantly, government has
vast authority to use its financial resources and bully pulpit to craft
messages that serve content-, or even viewpoint-specific, ends.

2

Cf. Karl L. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About
How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 399 (1950) (outlining his famous attack on the canons of statutory construction on the ground that even the most important
canons have competing canons that have an opposite effect).
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Assessments of speech “harms” and “burdens” also vary contextually in ways that may limit speech freedoms. Acceptance of a government benefit or entry into a regulated profession often means
that one’s expression can be very restricted, notwithstanding more
general claims that government cannot compel our allegiance or impose orthodoxies.
3
Even more fundamentally, the scope of protected expression is
not as wide as the logic of the basic doctrine suggests. Extensive government content-based regulation of indisputably expressive material—for example, computer codes, financial statements, medical records, price agreements, trademarks, even web page content—often
escapes meaningful First Amendment review altogether, or is placed
beyond serious scrutiny through characterization as “conduct,”
4
“property,” or “evidence.”
Efforts to reconcile these doctrinal results, or to offer one, unifying theoretical framework for First Amendment problems, fail. They
are stymied by the sprawl of First Amendment coverage, the changing
variables and policies that influence the free speech balance across
contexts, the common law resistance to abandonment of precedent,
and the internal cacophony that all of this produces. A better understanding of free speech practice requires thinking that is factored,
not formulaic; contextual, not trans-contextual; dynamic, not static;
tentative, not absolutist; plural, not singular.
This Article demonstrates these points in two steps.
Part I describes in broad strokes the current state of doctrinal and
theoretical affairs in the free speech realm. It focuses in particular
on the significance of “above-the-line” treatment of speech regulations that trigger elevated scrutiny. This overview shows that the doctrine offers, at most, a set of norms and questions that inform the judicial analysis rather than a “fixed star” or fixed principles.
Part II critiques three recent Roberts Court interventions that ignore this doctrinal reality in worrisome ways. The Court has suggested that speaker identity distinctions should always trigger elevated
3
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Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765 (2004) (discussing the scope of the coverage issue and its importance to First Amendment theory).
Id. at 1769 (“It is not that the speech [or anything else] is not protected [by the First
Amendment]. Rather, the entire event . . . does not present a First Amendment issue at
all, and the government’s action is consequently measured against no First Amendment
standard whatsoever. The First Amendment just does not show up.”).
I disagree with the statement that the event does not present a First Amendment issue at all, but agree that meaningful judicial review rarely occurs. See infra text accompanying notes 43–46.
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scrutiny, that only traditional and historical categorical exceptions
are constitutional, and that government speech is wholly beyond the
traditional freedom of speech principles. Yet none of these formalistic, absolutist statements can be squared with other free speech doctrines, significant zones of traditional government regulation, or even
common sense. They also weaken the Court’s ability to balance the
conflicting policy concerns that arise in a host of speech-sensitive areas such as regulation of data collection, licensed professionals, or
other commercial actors.
The Court’s compelled speech cases offer especially vivid evidence
that doctrinal nuance is essential, and that the Court’s more rigid approach to free speech is unsustainable. Contrary to Justice Robert
Jackson’s rhetorically arresting “no fixed star” celebration of individ5
ual freedom from compulsory pledges of allegiance, government often demands private expression, crafts it, or silences it altogether.
Constitutionally mandated oaths of office, occupation-specific codes
of conduct, audience and context-specific regulation of the content
of information disclosures, many employment and civil rights statutes, student conduct codes, conditions on government benefits, antifraud laws, and many other forms of government speech regulation
demonstrate that there is no across-the-board constitutional mandate
against government-compelled expression.
Indeed, government-compelled expression or silence may often
be sensible and warranted. Much existing and emerging science displays many ways in which human beings suffer from systematic cognitive weaknesses that have direct implications for debates about government-imposed, speech-sensitive interventions aimed at correcting
6
for those deficiencies. Silence about “bad science” may advance collective interests in expert disciplinary knowledge. Enforced disclosure of identity, of risks of products, or of a commercial actor’s authorized exemption from general anti-discrimination laws may be
warranted in some contexts, on public information or other legitimate grounds. At a minimum, uncertainty about the relative costs
and benefits of mandatory expression or silence may warrant greater
deference to government interventions than judicial strict scrutiny allows.
Perhaps anticipating this objection, the Court in 2013 addressed
compelled speech doctrine in a refreshingly restrained and non5

6

See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642. The approach I favor herein draws from the enduringly insightful account of constitutional interpretation outlined in BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE
NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
See infra text accompanying notes 232–41.
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formalistic fashion.7 I argue that this recent turn in the Court’s First
Amendment approach is the right one and should be followed more
generally in future cases. I also offer two examples drawn from recent First Amendment scholarship that illustrate nicely how nonformalistic analysis might assist in thinking about thorny free speech
issues that arise when government seeks to regulate data production,
data dissemination, and expert disciplinary knowledge.
I. THE LAY OF THE LAND
That the free speech terrain is rugged is hardly news to anyone
who considers the vast zone of human activity potentially covered by
the phrase “freedom of speech.” As Fred Schauer observed nearly a
decade ago, to imagine “that the boundaries of the First Amendment
are delineated by the ordinary language meaning of the word
8
‘speech’ is simply implausible.” If the First Amendment boundaries
were construed to reach all speech, it would require quite a radical revision of common law principles of tort law, contract law, criminal
law, property law, and much well-accepted statutory law. The implications for judicial case load alone counsel against such a reading of
the First Amendment.
Yet we already are living with a greatly expanded First Amendment, if not one that extends to the farthest limits of the elastic
phrase “freedom of speech.” Freedom of speech’s march to new territories began in earnest after 1925, when it was officially deemed to
be a right incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the Four9
teenth Amendment. The pace of the march accelerated dramatically
post-1960, when the Court added calls to criminal action that fall
10
11
12
short of incitement, vulgarity, commercial speech, and defamato13
ry expression, to the higher tier First Amendment fold. More recently, the Court has given “strict scrutiny” level protection to corpo14
15
rate campaign expenditures, hate speech, lies about one’s military
7

8
9
10
11
12
13
14

Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321 (2013) (holding unconstitutional § 7631(f) of the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003, which required that organizations accepting federal
funds to combat these diseases abroad maintain policies explicitly opposing prostitution).
Schauer, supra note 3, at 1773.
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748
(1976).
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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honors,16 videos of animal cruelty,17 and violent videos sold to mi18
nors. The clear thrust of the modern case law thus has been toward
expanding freedom of speech protection, even in areas of traditional
state and federal regulatory control, notwithstanding the Court’s
19
claim that original understandings define free speech limits.
The broader the First Amendment reach becomes, the harder it is
to explain why other regulatory zones remain off limits. Likewise, if
some speech remains subject to significant regulation then it becomes more difficult to explain why speech that may pose similar
harms is better insulated from government regulation. Why does
regulation of commercial speech, but not restriction of data mining,
now excite serious freedom of speech concern? Why is commercial
speech not protected when it is false or misleading, while false or misleading claims made by political candidates get a wide First Amendment berth? Why is speech that recklessly impugns a person’s business reputation punishable, but not speech that viciously attacks a
person based on his or her race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation,
or other core-identity traits? The perceived harms of business or
commercial speech, speech transmitted via new technologies, speech
aimed at minors, or other forms of speech make strict scrutiny in
many zones unpalatable. In still other areas, the nature of the expressive activity—such as the production of disciplinary standards of
expert knowledge—makes government content-specific regulation of
the expression arguably more beneficial than dangerous. Yet there is
no authoritative or noncontroversial hierarchy of harms that enables courts to
confidently place one regulatory zone beyond the reach of the ever-expanding
freedom of speech grasp, especially if one invokes the most sweeping pro-speech
rhetoric and logic in many modern cases.
The result is extremely messy free speech doctrine—both “abovethe-line,” where the basic speech rules currently do apply, and “below-the-line,” where much expression still escapes elevated scrutiny
and receives rational basis review, at the most.
This messiness is not likely to change or be solved by more free
speech formalism or absolutism, though the Roberts Court seems intent upon introducing more of both.

15
16
17
18
19

R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010).
Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1586 (holding that a federal statute criminalizing the depiction of
animal cruelty for commercial purposes violated the First Amendment).
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One reason the messiness will endure is that we are so ambivalent
about freedom of speech. We are unwilling to reject the modern
boundary-crashing that has led to protection of sexually explicit expression, artistic expression, blasphemous speech, vulgarity, dangerous political speech, and deeply offensive speech. We also are unwilling to accept unfettered government power to condition its grants on
private grantees’ agreement to sing to the government’s tune. Finally, once a new zone gains free speech protection, we are loath to remove it. We love our First Amendment rhetoric and many of its results, despite the analytical chaos they produce.
But we also reject free speech without meaningful limits. Contextsensitive historical, aesthetic, political, and other practical obstacles
cause courts to tread softly when they apply the First Amendment to
historically unprotected territory. Government regulations of speech
20
may make us safer and less likely to be deceived or seduced into
making bad economic or political decisions while also making us
more participatory, more democratic, better insulated from invasions
of our privacy, less subject to hostile verbal environments, better
served by licensed professionals, or more egalitarian. New and adventurous applications of the First Amendment therefore often generate caveats, nuances, and doctrinal complexities. These caveats
create doctrinal riffs that make for further doctrinal chaos.
The more accurate statement thus is that we love our expanded
First Amendment freedoms, except when we hate their costs. New
technologies have intensified both of these emotions, sometimes in
the same person. YouTube is great! YouTube is disgusting!
In this Part, I begin with the basic doctrinal topography. The
overview is critical to appreciating the complexities of doctrinal analysis and to remembering the structure we actually have, before locating current controversies within that structure.
I then discuss three Roberts Court renovations of the basic free
21
speech doctrine that blink at this doctrinal reality. In each, the
Court exalts absolutism over pragmatism, and gauzy free speech
flourishes over more detailed and transparent consideration of the
22
multiple vectors that converge in many free speech scenarios. The
three examples are as follows: (1) the insistence in Citizens United v.

20
21
22

See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010) (justifying expressive
burdens on national security grounds).
See infra text accompanying notes 104–52.
Some of these lines call to mind Ring Lardner’s terrific line, “Shut up he explained.”
RING W. LARDNER, JR., THE YOUNG IMMIGRUNTS 78 (1920).
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FEC23 and Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.,24 that speaker-sensitive speech
regulations must trigger strict scrutiny; (2) the rule announced in
25
United States v. Stevens that no “new” categorical exceptions to this
rule can be developed; and (3) the statement in Pleasant Grove v.
26
Summum that “government speech” lies beyond the scope of free
speech protection.
Finally, I discuss the theoretical struts to freedom of speech doctrine and explain why we need theories, not one theory, to fully capture the normative features of our current free speech practice. Taken together, the doctrinal and theoretical insights display that
modern free speech constitutional analysis is best understood as a
pragmatic exercise undertaken by courts embedded in a common law
27
tradition.
A. Doctrinal Topography
California recently adopted legislation that bans the use of therapies by mental health professionals designed to change minors’ sexual orientations, including efforts to “change behaviors or gender expressions, or to eliminate or reduce sexual or romantic attractions or
28
feelings toward individuals of the same sex.” Is this state law a violation of mental health professionals’ free speech, as a form of “compelled silence?” If so, does similar reasoning apply to government
regulations that require silence about abortion options by federal
29
grant recipients, or that prevent doctors from recommending “off30
label” uses of drugs?
The State of South Dakota requires doctors, as a matter of “informed consent,” to warn abortion patients that this procedure puts
31
them at “increased risk of suicide ideation and suicide.” And the
State of New Mexico’s Human Rights Act prohibits public accommodations from discriminating against people based on their sexual ori23
24
25
26
27
28

29
30
31

Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010).
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009).
See CARDOZO, supra note 5.
S. 1172, 2011-2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012), available at https://leginfo.legislature.ca.
gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201120120SB1172. See also Pickup v. Brown, 740
F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014) (discussing Sentate Bill 1172’s potential affect on free speech
interests).
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012).
Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889,
892, 894 (8th Cir. 2012).
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entation.32 New Mexico would apply this prohibition to a commercial
photographer who refuses to photograph a commitment ceremony
between two women. Is either law a violation of the regulated professional’s freedom of expression, as a form of “compelled speech?”
Finally, the federal Food and Drug Administration adopted a cigarette packaging rule that requires that cigarette packages add a large,
graphic image designed to warn purchasers of the health risks of
33
smoking. May the cigarette manufacturers refuse to redesign their
packages on the ground that they have a First Amendment right not
34
to be the Government’s messenger? If so, does that outcome affect
the answer to either question above, especially whether doctors can
be required to bear the government’s suicide warnings?
The answers to these free speech questions are surprisingly unclear and complicated. Seeing this requires a peek at the basic structure of free speech doctrine and an appreciation of the many ways in
which the basic structure is subject to significant contextual riffs.
The doctrinal rules can be visualized as four pyramids. The most
familiar principles focus on the content and nature of the expression
and how both affect whether and how the speech is protected from
government regulation. They also focus on the purpose or justification for government regulation of expression—especially whether it
is targeted at suppression of information versus regulation of other,
content-neutral, or “secondary effects.”
These free speech “first steps” look like this:

32

33
34

New Mexico Human Rights Act (NMHRA), N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1-1 to 28-1-13 (West
2014). See also Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013), cert. denied,
134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014) (holding that application of the law to a commercial photographer
did not violate her freedom of expression).
See infra note 181.
Id.
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Applying this pyramid alone would suggest that all of the examples above should fall under strict scrutiny, because in each the government is regulating private expression in a content—even viewpoint—specific fashion. One could argue that treatment by a mental
35
health professional is actually conduct, even if delivered via speech,
but the stronger argument is that expression is plainly involved here
even though it may be regulated differently than other types of expression because of its therapeutic impact and setting. Consequently,
the psychologist, the photographer, the doctor, and the tobacco
company all should have very powerful claims that the government
regulations are presumptively unconstitutional.
Of course, the cases are difficult because the matter is not this
simple. Common sense and considerable case law show that the
“content-specific-regulation-equals-strict scrutiny” principle does not

35

See Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1215 (9th Cir. 2014) (stating that “medical ‘treatment,’ . . . although effected by verbal communication nevertheless constitutes ‘professional conduct’”).
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apply in many, many settings, including the ones in which these private parties operate.
One factor that can modify the basic principle has to do with the
nature of the government burden in question. A criminal prohibition on purely private speech about abortion, same-sex marriage, or
the health risks of smoking would receive quite different judicial
treatment than conditioning a government benefit, commercial activity, or professional license on compliance with speech-sensitive messaging. Incidental or conditional burdens on expression offer government more regulatory room than do direct prohibitions.
A schematic, non-exhaustive illustration of the point looks like
this:

Setting also matters. A “pig in a parlor” is not tolerated in ways
that it might be on the proverbial street corner. A third doctrinal
pyramid that focuses on the types of forums available for private expression also must be added to the doctrinal picture. It looks like
this:
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A final, overlapping pyramid focuses on the speaker. Private actors often assume public roles, or otherwise affect public interests in
ways that may justify government limits on their expressive autonomy.
As schematic reminder of this well-rehearsed limit on expressive autonomy looks like this:
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One could add a fifth pyramid, focused on whether the government
is sufficiently involved in, or entangled with the expressive activity to
36
deem the speech or its suppression to be “state action.” Of course,
this same problem is a central part of Pyramid Four. For purposes of
37
this discussion, state action therefore will be presumed.
Implicit in all four pyramids is the free speech interest of the audience or future speaker. Regulation of the speaker obviously affects
what the target audience does (or does not) hear, as well as what information future speakers may gain or lose. Most expression (though
not all: think a personal diary or book of poetry, buried in one’s back
38
The
yard) has an explicitly interactive and social element.
cost/benefit analysis that is embedded in the basic free speech tests
thus cannot be fully understood without these audience interests in
39
mind, however they are expressed.
36

37

38
39

This issue is of colossal importance in the Internet era, given that private actors control
access to major communication channels. See Derek E. Bambauer, Ghost in the Network,
162 U. PA. L. REV. 1011, 1019 (2014) (discussing government regulation of cyberactivity);
Derek E. Bambauer, Orwell’s Armchair, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 863, 869 (2012) (exploring the
proper role of government in regulating the Internet which is primarily owned by private
actors); Jeffrey Rosen, The Deciders: Facebook, Google, and the Future of Privacy and Free Speech,
in CONSTITUTION 3.0: FREEDOM AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE, 69, 80–81 (Jeffrey Rosen
& Benjamin Wittes eds., 2011) (examining how Internet companies have regulated
speech).
One also could add a pyramid that displayed the range of harms that speech can cause
and how the perceived risk or severity of the harm influences whether speech is protected. This factor, however, is an inherent assignment of the level of scrutiny applied to
speech (such as compelling interest or important interest) as well as the degree to which
courts will defer to government estimations of harm under an assigned level.
See infra text accompanying note 87.
Sometimes these audience-sensitive concerns surface as reasons to curb the speech. See,
e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 394 , 419–21 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing the distortion of political speech that can occur when
economically powerful voices dominate); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448–49
(1969) (overturning a statute on grounds that it did not adequately distinguish between
incitement and constitutionally protected advocacy speech); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S.
315, 320–21 (1951) (finding that speech that provokes hostile audiences is protected but
loses protection once it becomes incitement); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 573 (1942) (holding that fighting words are not protected speech).
Other times they surface as objections to regulation, based on the fuzzy “right to receive ideas,” or arguments for a public right of access to government controlled data. See,
e.g., Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Sch. Free Union Dist. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 872 (1982)
(holding that school boards may not remove books because they dislike the ideas in the
books); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564, 568 (1969) (preventing states from criminalizing the private possession of obscene material); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S.
301, 306–07 (1965) (overturning a statute that required an addressee to write to the
Postmaster General in order to receive communist propaganda material).
In the theoretical arena, the audience interest is most visible within the “marketplace
of ideas,” or political-based theories about the reach of freedom of expression. See also
Seana Valentine Shiffrin, A Thinker-Based Approach to Freedom of Speech, 27 CONST.
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The above points may seem embarrassingly obvious. Yet the case
law and especially its most triumphant free speech rhetoric often
suppress the obvious. Thus, it bears repeating as we consider the
foregoing arguments of the licensed professional, the commercial
photographer, and the tobacco company: content regulation of
speech often happens without judicial strict scrutiny.
Yet much will hinge on whether they can locate their expression
above-the-line and not subject to one of the many caveats to full strict
scrutiny. The strict scrutiny test is extraordinarily difficult to meet
40
when the speech falls on the tip of each of the four pyramids.
The government, in turn, will argue that their otherwise abovethe-line speech falls within one of the traditional exceptions to free
speech (for example, incitement, fighting words, true threats), that
41
no viewpoint discrimination within that exception has occurred, that
the expression is more conduct than speech, or that other reasons
support allowing it to regulate the speech without satisfying strict
42
scrutiny per se. If it fails, then government has the heavy burden of
proving that the regulation advances a compelling government purpose in a narrowly tailored fashion.
The government may remind the Court of how much expression
by commercial actors and regulated professionals falls below the most
43
exacting scrutiny line, and may not even receive intermediate scru44
tiny. For example, price-fixing, much speech covered by trademark
45
law, securities prospectuses, speech that has independent legal sig-

40

41
42

43
44
45

COMMENT. 283, 283–84 (2011) (discussing theories that provide a foundation for free
speech protections).
The test is not impossible to meet. See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.
Ct. 2705, 2731 (2010) (finding that an anti-terrorism statute that abridged freedom of
speech survived strict scrutiny because it provided for the common defense).
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382–83 (1992) (noting traditional limited expectations to free speech).
The Court has said that the categorical exceptions cover speech that government has an
interest in regulating because of the “distinctively proscribable content”; thus, they meet
strict scrutiny. Id. at 384. The categories may be seen as short hand ways of assuring that
government has a compelling, historically grounded reason for the regulation, and the
overbreadth doctrine assures that the regulations are narrowly tailored.
The Court has noted that “[t]he inquiry into the protected status of speech is one of law,
not fact.” Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 n.7 (1983).
Government’s own speech is a special case analysis. See infra text accompanying notes
141–51.
But see Rebecca Tushnet, Trademark Law as Commercial Speech Regulation, 58 S.C. L. REV.
737, 738 (2007) (discussing the different approach of First Amendment law and trademark law and noting that the “expansion of trademark law to include protection against
dilution, which operates even when consumers are not confused or deceived, puts obvious pressure on [reasoning that trademark and false advertising laws pose no constitutional problems because they regulate only false and misleading commercial speech]”).
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nificance as a “performative act” (such as saying “I do!” at a wedding
ceremony or “You have a deal!” in a contract case) fall below the ele46
vated scrutiny line.
The government also may argue that speech by commercial actors
and professionals has long received First Amendment treatment that
differs from “street corner” speech by private parties. For example,
commercial speech once received only rational basis review—the level of scrutiny generally applied to socioeconomic legislation under
substantive due process. That a commercial actor used pure speech
to hawk his or her wares did not alter the constitutional analysis. In
1976, the Court hoisted this speech above-the-line and today, commercial speech regulations are subject to the Central Hudson test—but
47
this only gives “commercial speech” (properly defined) elevated, not
full-blown, strict scrutiny. And the advertisement must be truthful,
48
not misleading, and about a legal activity.
Finally, the government should explain that the movement of
commercial speech to elevated scrutiny status has not been smooth.
Concerns about the potential dangers of commercial speech still
prompt government interventions that are content-specific, speakerspecific, audience-protective, burdensome, and even viewpoint49
specific. The Central Hudson test permits these adjustments, if the
government can prove that they are based on a significant government interest and are properly tailored to advance that interest.
Such adjustments would doom the same measures were they aimed at
pure “political speech”; and traditional First Amendment bromides
about curing bad speech with counter speech mesh poorly with some
commercial regulatory schemes premised on pessimistic assumptions
50
The
about our cognitive capacities and decision-making skills.
Court insists that regulators avoid justifications that smack of pure pa46
47
48

49

50

Speech can migrate upward, though this presents doctrinal complexities. See infra text
accompanying notes 104–25.
See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66–68 (1983) (discussing characteristics of commercial speech).
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980) (holding that protected commercial speech must concern a lawful activity and not
be misleading). The same is true of many torts that are now subject to First Amendment
caveats, such as defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and public disclosure of private facts. The cases set forth a patchwork of tests that may limit recovery, elevate standards of proof, or require malice as a condition of recovery in ways that depart
from the basic rules about content-specific regulation of speech in other contexts.
See, e.g., Coyote Publ’g, Inc. v. Miller, 598 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
1556 (2011) (upholding a ban on brothel ads in Nevada, which allows the sale of sexual
services in some counties).
Id. at 566 (establishing a four part test to analyze commercial speech cases).
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ternalism,51 but it has not yet abandoned the intermediate scrutiny
approach to commercial speech regulation.
The government also might refer to other cases in which local
government is allowed to regulate commercial actors in ways that depart from traditional strict scrutiny for content-specific regulations.
For example, differential zoning of adult businesses that present or
sell sexually explicit expression triggers elevated but not strict constitutional attention. The Court strained doctrinal credulity to get
there, by declaring that the zoning of adult businesses is prompted by
a “content-neutral” justification of containing “secondary effects” rather than regulation aimed at suppressing the community effects of a
particular category of undeniably expressive, but disfavored materi52
al. It also imposed an amazingly weak evidentiary burden on local
governments to prove that secondary effects, not distaste for sexually
explicit materials and those who sell them, were the basis for the con53
tent-specific zoning decisions.
These outlier cases and the many examples of commercial and
professional regulation that historically have not triggered strict scrutiny make it both easier and harder to advance new arguments for locating categories of speech above-the-line. It is easier because more
types of speech today are located above-the-line—including speech
that historically was subject solely to toothless rational basis review.
Commercial speech is an excellent example of a relatively recent and
dramatic movement of speech to greater speech protection. Advocates can argue that the potential adverse consequences of protecting
other historically unprotected speech are no worse than the potential
harms of protecting Viagra, casino, liquor, or tobacco advertisements.
Yet the fuzziness also can make it harder to elevate traditionally
non-protected expression to elevated scrutiny. The outlier cases
demonstrate the many difficulties of managing grey zone cases. Fear
of making the doctrinal morass worse may cause some justices to balk
at moving traditionally unprotected speech to semi-protected status.
Relocating expression wholly above-the-line also raises significant
51

52
53

See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996) (noting that “[t]he First
Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in
the dark for what the government perceives to be their own good”). Even regulation of
“misleading” commercial speech may be vulnerable if the speech is truthful.
See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986) (introducing the
“secondary effects” justification).
City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 453 (2002) (upholding a City of
Los Angeles ordinance that relied on a 1977 study). But see AnnexBooks, Inc. v. City of
Indianapolis, 740 F. 3d 1136 (7th Cir. 2014) (striking down ordinance for lack of statistically significant evidence).
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risks if one considers the public policy issues at stake and believes
government regulations best promote these interests despite the private speech costs.
Finally, once lifted, speech rarely moves back downward. Common law torts that once allowed recovery for some defamatory or offensive speech but that now are subject to free speech defenses are
54
one example. Another powerful example is race or gender “hate
speech.” This speech currently falls above-the-line but was subject
during the late 1980s and early 1990s to strenuous arguments that it
should be categorically downgraded. Hate speech is a peculiarly destructive form of speech that shares features of traditional free speech
exceptions such as libel, true threats, fighting words, or verbal har55
assment. Critics maintain that hate speech also undermines democratic discourse, chills contributions to the “marketplace of ideas,”
and invades individual autonomy more than it advances that goal. It
may compromise equality goals, which have independent constitutional salience, and are imbedded in basic free speech principles
about speaker autonomy, prohibitions on viewpoint discrimination,
56
and diversity of viewpoints.
The Court nevertheless refused to permit government to regulate
this speech as a categorical exception, even if it was contained within
57
a traditional exception to strict scrutiny. For example, measures
that prohibit only fighting words based on race or gender were
deemed to be impermissible viewpoint discrimination within a free
speech exception—like selecting out only obscenity written by Demo58
crats for prohibition.
54

55

56

57
58

See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011) (applying free speech principles in case
involving tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 282–83 (1964) (applying free speech principles to tort of defamation).
See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L. J. 431, 453 (1990) (discussing the differences between racial insults and
protected speech); Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s
Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2357–58 (1989) (“Racist speech . . . presenting an idea so
historically untenable, so dangerous, and so tied to perpetuation of violence . . . it is
properly treated as outside the realm of protected discourse.”); Richard Delgado, Words
That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 133, 178–79 (1982) (arguing that freedom of expression generally benefits society, but racism and hate speech “further[] all the evils caused by the suppression of
speech”). For a recent, especially ambitious theoretical work arguing that hate speech
should be regulable, see JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH 15–17 (2012).
See Toni M. Massaro, Equality and Freedom of Expression: The Hate Speech Dilemma, 32 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 211, 214 (1991) (discussing the tension between equality and liberal theories of freedom of expression, as applied to hate speech).
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 387 (1992).
Id. at 388.
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As I will explain, downgrading speech also has gotten harder in
recent years. The Roberts Court recently stated that the only legitimate, categorical exceptions are historical and traditional ones: new
59
ones cannot be coined, only “discovered.” Consequently, the consti60
tutional ratchet arguably works upward only.
The Court’s ostensibly formulaic and tiered approach to free
speech has produced applications, holdings, and exceptions that
make the “rules” hard to take seriously. They also constrain the
Court’s own ability to balance relevant concerns.
Again, the history of hate speech regulation is instructive. Because the case law regards most regulation of hate speech as impermissible content-specific regulation, the government must adopt
broader rules to capture the worst forms of hate speech (for example,
it must prohibit all fighting words, including hate speech), or write
61
rules aimed only at the “conduct” component of hate speech. Government also can regulate racist speech in bounded settings, such as
the workplace and public schools, but in ways that are difficult to
square with general claims that government cannot impose viewpoint
62
orthodoxy or impose “political correctness.” At the same time, the
private social, economic, and professional penalties for using race- or
63
gender-inflamed speech have mounted. Not all speech regulation
derives from law, and the state action doctrine insulates private
speech sanctions from constitutional control. Context therefore still
matters to regulation of hate speech, as it does for all above-the-line
speech. But its offensive content also still matters, in ways that betray
residual unease with simplistic statements that the First Amendment
protects speaker rights even if the speaker is bigoted, vile, cruel, or
64
disgusting.
59
60
61
62

63

64

See infra text accompanying notes 130–31.
An important caveat to this are cases in which the Roberts Court has weakened protection
of other expression, such as public employee speech. See infra note 97.
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 798, 809 (2000).
For example, government employers could discipline an employee for racist speech that
disrupts the workplace or creates a hostile working environment. See Eugene Volokh,
What Speech Does “Hostile Work Environment” Harassment Law Restrict?, 85 Geo. L.J. 627
(1997) (discussing workplace speech restrictions and implications for freedom of speech
values).
Consider, for example, the recent controversy over food show celebrity Paula Deen, who
lost multiple business contracts after evidence surfaced that she used racist epithets in the
past.
The emerging problems of “revenge porn” and nonconsensual sharing or re-publication
of sexually explicit texts—called “sexts”—show how complicated the doctrinal issues can
become even when the “speech” in question is truthful, not misleading, was self-created,
and meant for purely intimate exchange. See, e.g., Derek E. Bambauer, Exposed, 98 MINN.
L. REV. 2025, 2032–33 (2014) (discussing harms and solutions regarding the sharing of
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In short, current free speech doctrine is very multi-factored and
fractured. Traditional pro-speech bromides and Pyramid One principles suppress this complexity.
B. Methodologicial Coherence
Yet despite the many ambiguities and caveats within free speech
doctrine, especially at the boundary line between elevated scrutiny
and rational basis scrutiny, there is a methodological “there there,” of
sorts. Tiers matter; the basic rules of Pyramid One matter; aspirational free speech rhetoric matters; but flexibility and realism also matter.
This is best seen by re-examining the four pyramids, as well as the
quite strong consensus among scholars, judges and lawyers about how
to argue within them.
1. Pyramid One
Pyramid One displays how the expressive dimension of conduct
must dominate for the expression to make it above-the-line. Also, if
the expression is being regulated for other speech-neutral reasons, and
is aimed at behavior that is more properly characterized as conduct,
then the government often need only satisfy rational basis. For example, if a political activist resorts to violent acts to express her political views—say, by soliciting a co-conspirator to assassinate the President, or by hurling a dirty bomb into a Fourth of July celebration—
the First Amendment offers no refuge. Both acts are “expressive” and
political; yet neither is protected, and neither is subject to freedom of
speech basic rules. Rational basis applies, and is easily satisfied.
In some cases, however, the government regulation in question
may aim at conduct in a manner that scoops up substantial expression. In this grey zone between the basic rules (strict scrutiny) and
rational basis, the Court will conduct an analysis to determine whether the government purpose for regulating the conduct is speech neutral, and whether the regulation leaves open ample alternative ave65
nues of expression.
A similar “grey zone” analysis involves content-specific regulation
of expression where the government insists its primary goal is to con-

65

intimate media such as sexts); John A. Humbach, ‘Sexting’ and the First Amendment, 37
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 433, 438–49 (2010) (considering the implications of sexting and
First Amendment protections).
See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 381–82 (1968) (holding that the governmetal
interest prohibiting the destruction of draft cards was aimed to ensure the functioning of
the Selective Service System rather than prohibiting the plaintiff’s speech).
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tain the “secondary effects” of the speech (for example, zoning of
66
adult businesses). Aiming at expression to suppress knowledge triggers the loudest free speech alarms, and courts are most aggressive
when they conclude this is the government’s true purpose. Aiming at
speech to suppress crime or preserve order triggers a lower level of
scrutiny.
Pyramid One is the most formidable one in the freedom of speech
landscape because it sets forth the most fundamental distinctions on
which all subsequent characterization moves depend. This is why
judges and scholars fret most over locating speech above or below the
elevated scrutiny line in that frame: the doctrinal, normative and
practical consequences of this categorization move are the most profound.
2. Pyramid Two
Pyramid Two shows that the nature of the burden imposed may
alter the fate of a speech restriction. For example, when the only
burden imposed on the speech is a legitimate time, place, manner
limit—not an absolute prohibition of the speech—then intermediate
67
scrutiny applies. Also key to this inquiry is the government’s purpose
in regulating the expression—specifically, whether the regulation is
68
adopted “without reference to the content of the regulated speech.”

66
67

68

See supra text accompanying notes 52–53.
See, e.g., Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 321–22 (2002) (upholding permit system
as valid, content-neutral licensing ordinance); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781, 791 (1989) (setting forth content-neutrality test).
Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 719–20 (2000); see also id. (holding that a government regulation is “‘content neutral’ if is justified without reference to the content of regulated
speech”); Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 384–85 (1997) (upholding fixed buffer zones around abortion clinics because such injunctions were not
content based); Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 763 (1994) (“[T]he fact
that the injunction covered people with a particular viewpoint does not itself render the
injunction content or viewpoint based.”).
This can be a fraught inquiry, as recent abortion protest, funeral protest, and free
speech “bubble” cases show. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011) (finding a funeral protest to be protected speech); see also McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518
(2014) (striking down buffer zones around abortion clinics); see generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom of Speech: Problems in the Supreme
Court’s Application, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 49, 49 (2000) (noting that almost every recent free
speech case turned on whether the law was characterized as content neutral); Alan K.
Chen, Statutory Speech Bubbles, First Amendment Overbreadth, and Improper Legislative Purpose,
38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 31, 34 (2003) (discussing how lawmakers may draft overbroard
speech regulations to obscure an illicit discriminatory legislative purpose); Geoffrey R.
Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 46 (1987) (analyzing the Court’s
content-neutral versus content-specific distinction).
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A bad government purpose, under the First Amendment, is to regu69
late speech “because of disagreement with the message it conveys.”
Pyramid Two makes especially vivid why flexible, rather than formalistic, approaches to free speech analysis better anticipate the
range of regulatory burdens courts may encounter, and why results
may change as burdens lighten. It is—and should be—easier for government to justify non-funding of expression than prohibition of expression. Likewise, it is—and should be—easier for government to
justify speech burdens on private persons who voluntarily enter professions, commercial or public settings, or assume other roles in
which their speech is constrained in ways that would not be allowed
“off the job.” Of course, there also are limits on the government
power to set these speech conditions, and drawing that constitutional
70
line is an intensely context-specific matter.
3. Pyramid Three
Pyramid Three adds one of these context-sensitive caveats: the
place of expression must be a public forum for elevated scrutiny—even
the more relaxed scrutiny given to content-neutral time, place, manner regulations or other “grey zone” regulations—to kick in. If an
adult political speaker wishes to “parade” through a military base,
then the speech falls below even the grey zone line of First Amendment elevated scrutiny. Put a familiar way, no “pigs in the non-public
forum parlor.”
4. Pyramid Four
Finally, Pyramid Four shows that speaker identity matters. Contrary to statements by the Roberts Court that imply that speaker71
sensitive speech rules always trigger strict scrutiny, the doctrine
72
plainly points to an opposite conclusion. Speaker-identity distinctions explain much of the vast terrain below the elevated scrutiny
line, where the constitutional presumption strongly favors government decisions about whether, and how, to burden expression. In
many of these cases, the speakers are defined according to occupa69
70
71
72

Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.
See infra text accompanying notes 217–18.
See infra text accompanying notes 104–27.
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 419–25 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (denouncing language in the Court’s opinion regarding the speaker identity restriction as a rationale for treating corporate and union
campaign expenditures the same as individual expenditures).
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tional, trade, or other roles that determine their expressive autonomy
73
Indeed, the Constitution itself makes this
and responsibilities.
point: it contains an explicit and mandatory script for the Presiden74
tial oath of office. This is surely “compelled speech” yet also clearly
allowed. In sum, who you are determines—in a dizzying array of circumstances—what you can say without significant, even criminal consequences. This is closely related to how different speech burdens affect the inquiry, as outlined in Pyramid Two: role-specific burdens
tend not to be absolute prohibitions on speech and thus trigger a
75
lower level of scrutiny.
C. Theoretical Struts
The doctrinal landscape also is undergirded by common theoretical struts. These likewise are expansive and context-sensitive, include
leaps of faith, are internally contradictory, but nevertheless are a crucial part of understanding how courts approach freedom of expression problems. The most influential theoretical justifications take
three forms: arguments from democracy, or political-based theo76
77
ries; arguments from autonomy, or liberalism-based theories; and
78
consequentialist arguments from knowledge or “truth.” Each suggests an important value served by free speech protection that courts
invoke to grant protection to speech despite its harmful consequences. All thus help explain the case law that elevates certain expression,
in proper contexts, to elevated scrutiny. Yet none by itself adequately
explains all of the terrain below the line of elevated scrutiny, or offers
a complete explanation for speech that falls above-the-line but is unprotected due to the many doctrinal caveats.
First Amendment theoretical work to date that attempts to craft a
unifying free speech lens comes in two forms. The first begins with
actual and potential applications of freedom of expression principles
73
74
75
76
77

78

See infra text accompanying notes 252–53.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
See supra text accompanying notes 67–70.
See, e.g., MEIKLEJOHN, infra note 81, at 27 (“[C]onflicting views may be expressed, must be
expressed, not because they are valid, but because they are relevant.”).
See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV.
964, 994 (1978) (arguing that voluntary speech is an act of creative self-definition or expression); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1982)
(“[T]he constitutional guarantee of free speech ultimately serves only one true value,
which I have labeled ‘individual self-realization.’”).
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[T]he best
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market . . . .”).
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and tries to knit them into a more unified and convincing whole.79
The second form begins with theoretical baselines, and proceeds
80
from these baselines to doctrinal applications. All seek to make an
analytical whole of this constitutional right. Many focus primarily on
the scope of the First Amendment, i.e. its “coverage,” rather than on
the specific rules about how to deal with speech that falls within this
81
coverage.
Unfortunately, even the most heroic efforts fall short.
Theories that are analytically crisp enough to limit applications of
freedom of speech in a meaningful way often cannot be squared with
a vast amount of modern doctrine and contemporary free speech in82
tuition, which makes them practically and normatively suspect.
These theoretical works rarely make a dent in the doctrine itself because they blink at too much doctrinal rhetoric and practice to prevail. Judges are massively reluctant to dislodge or substantially narrow bodies of case law that already protect certain expression, even
when the case law may be analytically or theoretically indefensible.
The theories also are normatively suspect because they omit coverage
of speech that we have grown accustomed to protecting, or block protection to expression many people believe is worthy of constitutional
protection.
Theories that attempt to map their normative framework onto existing doctrine, and develop normative explanations for its limited
83
scope, raise another concern: they sound like “just so stories.” For
example, in his analysis of free speech and expert knowledge, Robert
Post has argued that the First Amendment stands for protection of
“forms of conduct we deem necessary for the free formation of public
84
opinion,” and then links his theory to preferred doctrinal results.
He focuses in particular on the collision between theories of speech
79

80
81

82

83
84

See ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 5 (2012) (“To determine the purposes of the First Amendment, therefore, we must consult the actual shape of entrenched
First Amendment jurisprudence.”).
See generally C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1989) (setting
forth an autonomy-based theory of freedom of expression).
See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
(1984) (setting forth a democracy-based theory of freedom of expression that attempts to
restrict the scope of the First Amendment to political speech, narrowly defined).
See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF
THE PEOPLE 4 (1948) (discussing the popular belief in governmental limitation of “dangerous” speech); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1 (1971) (lamenting the lack of a consistent theory within constitutional law).
See, e.g., POST, supra note 79.
Id. at 15.
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that insist upon content- and viewpoint-neutrality, and the produc85
tion of expert knowledge.
Nobody wants a free-wheeling world of expert speech in which
government has greatly restricted power to regulate speech of quacks
or charlatans, or cannot umpire expertise disputes in ways that are
content-specific and value-laden. Post therefore is plainly right that
content-neutrality driven theories that subject all such speech to a
presumption of unconstitutionality make no real-world sense. But
even Post’s well-crafted alternative theoretical account, which he links
86
to “systematic patterns” in doctrine, leaves the reader wondering
why the doctrine he mostly accepts places things like animal crush
videos or funeral picketing under the First Amendment umbrella, but
not—say—obscenity. Or why things we say privately, with no design
or hope of influencing public opinion, should not be protected from
87
content-based government regulation.
Even if one accepts his view that the “free formation of public
opinion” is the organizing principle for freedom of speech coverage,
this does not irrefutably demonstrate why speech “between dentists
and their patients, between corporations and their shareholders, between product manufacturers and their customer” is not “normatively
88
necessary for influencing public opinion.” A political theory of free
speech, such as his, ultimately must define the boundaries of “political” and “public”—no easy task. This is especially so if one accepts
the insight that “the personal is the political” or views existing doctrine as “consistent with the view that the fundamental purpose of the
89
First Amendment is political, rather than ethical.”
As I explain more fully below, however, Post’s proposals should
not be condemned on this basis alone. All doctrine-respectful theories that attempt to limit the scope of free speech protection, to offer
a unifying theory of that limit as expressed in the case law, and to explain more precisely where the boundary lines of protection should
be drawn inevitably fall short of this very ambitious, perfectionist
goal. There is no one unifying theory that does the line-drawing job
alone.

85
86
87

88
89

Id. at 9.
Id. at 13.
See, e.g., Baker, supra note 77, at 993 (discussing the problem of private expression);
BAKER, supra note 80, at 6–46 (offering an especially thorough critique of marketplace
and political process theories of free speech and offering an autonomy-based theory instead).
POST, supra note 79, at 18.
Id. at 13.
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Theories that attempt to expand constitutionally protected expression, and that likewise seek to justify currently protected expression,
typically fail in a different way. The open-armed theories often are
too capacious to explain why any expression is not protected, or why
some speech regulations receive strict scrutiny under current doctrine and others receive only rational basis or so-called intermediate
scrutiny.
These theories are great at explaining why speech is valuable in a
liberal democracy that prizes individual autonomy, even if the content seems worthless to others; but even the best of them offer too little by themselves to inform or justify much past, present, or future judicial line-drawing that excludes some speech from the constitutional
90
fold. For example, autonomy-based theories of freedom of expression better explain protection of sexually explicit expression and a lot
91
of what passes for entertainment —think of the fascination some
have with the Kardashians or Honey Boo Boo—than do political theories based on democratic self-governance and enlightened voters.
But they ignore that “[m]uch speech that may be of great importance
to the autonomy of individual speakers receives no First Amendment
92
coverage at all.”
In short, all theories that begin with existing doctrine as a baseline, or as strong evidence of what should be protected speech, inevitably suffer from the problems of doctrine itself: internal inconsistency, competing policy concerns, historical and political barriers,
and analytically imperfect boundary decisions.
Recognizing this—or seeking to evade the problem—some consti93
tutional theorists simply ignore doctrine. They begin instead with
“big theory” musings and let the doctrinal chips fall where they may.
These are often intriguing works but present the “smell of the lamp”

90

91

92
93

The best ones see the concern about meaningful limits and seek to meet it. For example,
Baker distinguishes between protected expression under his liberty theory and uses of
property within a market exchange to explain why commercial speech is subject to regulation. See BAKER, supra note 80, at 196–224. Key to his account of protected speech is
whether it is “an attempt to create or affect the world in a way that has any logical or intrinsic connection to anyone’s substantive values or personal wishes.” Id. at 196.
See Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Pissing in the Snow: A Cultural Approach to the
First Amendment, 45 STAN. L. REV. 783, 785 (1993) (offering a decidedly unromantic look
at how electronic technologies “affect the very logic of much thought and discourse” and
outlining a “cultural approach” to freedom of expression that takes this drive to entertainment rather than enlightenment into account).
POST, supra note 79, at 11.
See, e.g., Shiffrin, supra note 39 (advocating for a “thinker-based foundation,” rather than
a speaker-based or listener-based justification, for freedom of speech protections).
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problem, because they are conceived in a context removed from real
world pressures—especially stare decisis.
Doctrine-free theorizing thus is of limited usefulness to those who
respect the “one artery” insight that motivates these First Amendment
theorists, but who also wish to translate First Amendment theory into
modern judicial practice. At some point, judges must operationalize
constitutional theory, and must consider the powerful constraints of
94
stare decisis and the common law method of decision-making.
So we are left with an intractable dilemma. Work that seeks to
reconcile normative theory with doctrine suffers inevitably and critically from the normative incommensurables within the doctrine, as
well as from the analytical gaps that are inherent in our common law
method of constitutional interpretation. Work that ignores the doctrine risks irrelevance to real-world constitutional problem solving.
And work that refuses to consult theory at all risks being normatively
rudderless, especially when it confronts new forms of expression or
government regulation that fall outside conventional doctrinal categories.
The real value of the free speech theories is that they remind
judges of the normative stakes of doctrinal decisions. Even the most
romantic rhetoric is of practical use because it cautions judges about
95
pathological fears—that “[m]en feared witches and burnt women.”
It harkens back to baseline democratic values and respect for individual autonomy, which place decision making in individual hands
even though they are not particularly skillful. This push away from
government regulation surely is not always prudent, but we abandon
it at our peril. Even progressives fear a world in which too much
96
speech is controlled by government, “for our own good.” The traditional theoretical struts of the First Amendment have a homily effect
that may serve a worthy civic purpose, despite our lapses into magical
thinking about individual cognitive abilities. Holding fast to free
speech protection is hardly a natural or historically consistent instinct: recall that most of the law we now have has developed since
1960, with the support of the more expansive theoretical expressions
and free speech aphorisms. The key is to cabin the magical thinking

94

95
96

See McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3028–31 (2010) (refusing to overturn the
post-Slaughter-house Cases case law that rendered the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or
Immunities Clause a virtual dead letter, on the ground that too much time and doctrine
stood in the way).
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amendment,
1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 419 (1990).
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that our most soaring free speech rhetoric inspires while preserving
its positive effects, and to see more clearly free speech doctrine and
practice as a complex balance between liberal aspirations and practical realities.
D. Summary
Speech must land above multiple lines to receive full-dress, strict
judicial scrutiny. Most speech does not make it there.
Speech that is placed above-the-line—even in the grey zones—and
is not subject to a traditional exception, gains extremely significant
protection. Speech that rises to the peaks of all four pyramids is
nearly invulnerable. Thus, it matters greatly where speech is placed,
97
and its berth—once identified—is quite hard to adjust.
But the four pyramids and their theoretical struts leave courts with
tremendous room to modify the basic rules thought to govern content-specific regulation of speech. Taken together, they show that
97

As explained below, however, the current Court has made this last statement far less convincing than it was only a decade ago. See infra text accompanying notes 102–22. The
Court has fortified the protection afforded to above-the-line speech. But it also has cast
doubt on the ongoing viability of all of the Pyramid Four distinctions in ways that may destabilize many government regulations that are premised on speaker identity. It has done
so using absolutist language that cannot be squared with the shape of Pyramid Four (it
flattens the pyramid), or the context-specific float it anticipates. It also counters the
Court’s long-standing practice of recognizing the First Amendment difference between
statements made in one’s individual, wholly “private” capacity, and those made through
corporate status, regulated professional status, commercial actor status, or other roles
that may bear materially on whether one’s speech is “free.” It cannot even be squared
with some of the Roberts Court’s own recent rulings. For example, speech by government employees made during the course of their official duties now is categorically below
the line. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (holding that “when public
employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate
their communications from employer discipline”); cf. Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369
(2014) (holding unanimously that a public employee who testifies truthfully at trial, pursuant to a subpoena, is protected from discipline for that speech, where the testimony was
not made pursuant to duties as an employee); Demers v. Austin, 729 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir.
2013) (holding Garcetti inapplicable to teaching or writing on academic matters by teachers employed by the state in higher education).
The biggest problem with all of these newer cases is that they speak in absolutist
terms. See, e.g., Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government’s Control of
Its Workers’ Speech to Protect Its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1, 7–8 (2009) (arguing for a
new constitutional framework for government speech that is more context sensitive);
Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Public Employee Speech Rights Fall Prey to an Emerging Doctrinal
Formalism, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1173, 1187 (2007) (critiquing the rejection of balancing in the context of public employee speech cases). The lines between the categories
of “protected” and “unprotected” are better viewed as permeable in practice, and properly so.
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strict scrutiny still is more of the exception than the rule when it comes
to judicial review of government regulations of private expression.
In a vast number of settings, the government can regulate the
98
content—not just the time, manner, or place—of our expression.
99
This applies even to our political expression. The landscape of free
speech doctrine thus is undulating, not flat. What we see most visibly
are the peaks of speech protection, but they are undergirded by considerable land that is not subject to meaningful review.
Saying that freedom of speech is a “fundamental right” and a
highly favored one is a true statement, but it also is a misleading one.
The most famous aphorisms of free speech—for example, one can100
not cry “fire” falsely in a crowded theater; “one man’s vulgarity is
101
another’s lyric”; the best response to bad speech is counter speech,
102
“[i]f there be time” —describe only a small fraction of the doctrinal
pyramids.
And even speech that falls within the First Amendment sweet spot
of strict scrutiny—at the peak of all four pyramids, and not within a
categorical exception—still may be regulated, in extreme cases: strict
103
The big blanket of freein theory is not necessarily “fatal in fact.”
dom of expression is revealed to be, on closer scrutiny, a hanky.
In sum, the doctrine is messy for enduringly important historical
and policy reasons. Speech is ubiquitous, of widely varying value to
society, and can cause countless harms that the government properly
should try to prevent. Application of free speech principles to common law and statutory zones developed without these principles in
mind have their own, competing logic.
Given this, absolutist approaches to free speech do not work, and
the only viable alternative is messy: balancing of interests. Judges
thus can hardly be blamed for producing case law that seems internally incoherent if one looks through a First Amendment lens alone.

98
99

100
101
102
103

See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (holding that government employees
have no freedom of speech protection for speech pursuant to their official duties).
See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (discussing when restraints on political management and campaigning by public employees may be justified by government interests
in efficiency and efficacy).
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972); cf. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct.
2411, 2421 (2013) (noting that “[s]trict scrutiny must not be strict in theory, but fatal in
fact”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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Correlatively, neither doctrinal work nor theoretical work should
be tossed aside simply because it too is analytically fissured, or does
not alone solve the persistent problem of defining free speech
boundaries. No theory or proposed doctrinal reconstruction can, or
will, mend all of the fissures or resolve all of the boundary disputes.
Nor do these types of imperfections within the doctrine and leading theoretical works necessarily matter. On the contrary, many of
these imperfections serve other important values that may include
protection of other constitutional rights.
The right doctrinal question is not whether a specific area of free
speech doctrine includes analytical flaws, but whether the flaws are
irrational and harmful. Do they make it harder to reach sound results in that particular zone, compromise the integrity of free speech
reasoning in other zones, or cause significant, real-world injuries?
The right theoretical question is not whether a theory solves every
free speech problem, but whether it casts meaningful light on the difficult task of explaining the fundamental purpose of the First Amendment. Does it better guide judges and scholars than other theories
do, while respecting other legitimate government purposes?
Finally, the best approach to both inquiries is incrementalist, multi-factored, realistic, non-formalist, non-perfectionist, and evolutionary. There is no one “fixed star” in the free speech universe. Judges
must follow multiple lights to make their way.
II. ROBERTS COURT RENOVATIONS COURT RENOVATIONS:
METHODOLOGICAL AND THEORETICAL MISSTEPS
The Roberts Court has made effecting the right balance between
free speech realism and perfectionism much harder, and having an
open judicial conversation about the internal complexities almost
impossible.
Rather, the Court seems intent upon modifying the basic free
speech architecture with new, calcifying statements from which it
cannot easily back up. In an effort (apparently) to fortify freedom of
speech protections in some contexts, the Roberts Court has embraced
“open the floodgates” free speech rhetoric and theories in formalistic
ways that are utterly blind to the well-known problems of open floodgates and formalism. It has done this while ignoring completely the
practical and significant limits on freedom of expression that the
Court itself has imposed in other cognate areas simultaneously. Three
of the new moves are especially worrisome.
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A. The Speaker Identity Renovation
The Court in 2011 struck down a Vermont law that banned the
sale or disclosure by pharmacies of information about physicians’
prescribing habits, provided that the information would be used to
104
The law did not
market drugs by the pharmaceutical companies.
apply to sale of the same information to private or academic re105
searchers. Detailers seek this information about doctor prescribing
habits in order to hone their sales pitches. Pharmacies have a mother
lode of information about these habits and sell the information to da106
Vermont sought to regulate this practice.
ta-mining companies.
The primary goals of the Vermont law singling out this practice of
selling prescriber-specific information were to protect doctor priva107
cy and to reduce the cost of medical services by shielding them
from information by detailers (pharmaceutical company representa108
tives) about brand-name drugs.
The Court concluded in Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., that the Vermont law violated the First Amendment. Writing for the majority,
Justice Anthony Kennedy emphasized that the statute in question
109
It thus was
“burdens disfavored speech by disfavored speakers.”
both content- and speaker-identity specific.
The opinion is an important one for many reasons: it gives
speech status to data; it treats the effort to regulate access to the data
as regulation of expression rather than conduct; and it rejects the justifications offered by Vermont for treating detailers differently than
other “speakers” as insufficient, despite their commercial interest in,
and ultimate use of, the data. Justice Kennedy also dismissed the
State’s argument that detailing may result in a feeling of being “co110
As he stated,
erced” or “harassed” on the part of physicians.
“[a]bsent circumstances far from those presented here, the fear that

104
105
106

107
108
109
110

Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011).
Id. at 2660.
See id. (“Pharmacies . . . receive prescriber-identifying information when processing prescriptions . . . . Many pharmacies sell this information to ‘data miners,’ firms that analyze
prescriber-identifying information and produce reports on prescriber behavior.”).
See id. at 2668 (“[T]he State contends that its law is necessary to protect medical privacy,
including physician confidentiality.”).
See id. at 2670 (“The State contends that [its law] advances important public policy goals
by lowering the costs of medical services and promoting public health.”).
Id. at 2663.
See id. at 2669 (“It is doubtful that concern for ‘a few’ physicians who may have ‘felt coerced and harassed’ by pharmaceutical marketers can sustain a broad content-based rule
like § 4631(d).”).
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speech might persuade provides no lawful basis for quieting it.”111
112
Doctors are “‘sophisticated and experienced’ consumers.”
In stressing the speaker-identity specific feature of the law as a reason to subject it to elevated scrutiny, Justice Kennedy revisited a
theme that was central to his opinion in Citizens United v. Federal Elec113
tion Commission. In that case, the disfavored speaker was a corporation. The Court rejected the argument that the corporate status of a
speaker is a compelling reason to treat the “speech”—independent
expenditures advocating the election of political candidates—
114
differently from the electoral speech of individuals.
The idea is neither novel nor unimportant in thinking about levels of speech protection. As Justice Lewis Powell said in First National
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, if we view the value of speech as informing
the audience, then it follows that “[t]he inherent worth of the speech
in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union,
115
or individual.” Justice Kennedy agrees strongly with this view of re116
strictions based on the identity of the speaker.
Yet his claim in Citizens United that “[n]o case before Austin [v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce] had held that Congress could prohibit
independent expenditures for political speech based on the speaker’s
117
corporate identity” should not be taken out of context, or reduced
to a less qualified assumption that all speaker-identity based restrictions trigger strict scrutiny. Nevertheless, the passage about
speaker identity in Sorrell—also written by Justice Kennedy—comes
perilously close.
Again, there is considerable free speech wisdom in compelling
government to be agnostic about the source of speech when it engages in regulation. Distinctions based on speaker identity have the
powerful whiff of viewpoint discrimination, and may violate the internal equality dimension that the First Amendment polices, if not
the Equal Protection Clause itself.

111
112
113
114
115
116
117

Id. at 2670 (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam)).
Id. at 2658 (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 775 (1993)).
558 U.S. 310 (2010) (holding that government may not, under the First Amendment,
suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity).
See id. at 341 (“We find no basis for the proposition that, in the context of political
speech, the Government may impose restrictions on certain disfavored speakers.”).
435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978).
See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340 (“Speech restrictions based on the identity of the
speaker are all too often simply a means to control content.”).
Id. at 348.
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But the unthinking application of this principle makes for immediate mischief if one considers how much of the doctrine is doing just
118
The source of speech matthat—distinguishing among speakers.
ters greatly to a vast swath of regulation that limits what commercial
speakers can say about their products, what professionals can say in
delivering professional services, what government employees can say
about internal matters, and what K–12 teachers can say about their
subject matter.
There may be—in fact, I am sure there are—“compelling” reasons
why all of these “speaker-identity” driven regulations are not struck
down on that basis. Not all speakers, speaking on the same topics,
whose speech is of undeniable value to “decisionmaking in a democ119
racy,” are situated similarly or speaking with similar motivations or
incentives. One therefore can concede, for example, that speech
about the properties of a drug conveys valuable information to con120
sumers that deserves some First Amendment protection, yet resist a
move to place speech by a product manufacturer on the same rung as
speech by an individual actor about that drug. In Sorrell, however, the
Court chided Vermont for distinguishing between requests for prescription-pattern data by pharmaceutical companies and requests by
researchers for the same data, on the ground that this was speakeridentity discrimination.
Yet it is commonplace for government to distinguish among types of
speakers in this manner—i.e. based upon their very different occupational roles, motivations, control over the uses of information, market
power, institutional commitment to speech values, and so on. Restrictions on attorney speech, for example, do not immediately excite
strict scrutiny under the First Amendment simply because they are
118

119

120

Cf. Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 HARV. L. REV. 84,
113–18 (1998) (arguing that although American free speech doctrine is uncomfortable
distinguishing among institutions, institutional specificity nevertheless surfaces in cases
that involve journalists, broadcast media, and education).
This is especially true if one gives a broad definition to speech that is “indispensable to
decisionmaking in a democracy.” Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777; see, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson &
John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65
VA. L. REV. 1, 18, 30 (1979) (warning that treatment of commercial speech as protected
speech risks resurrecting economic due process, “clothed in the ill-fitting garb of the
[F]irst [A]mendment”).
See Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 6
(2000) (“A pharmacist who advertises drug prices is said to engage in commercial speech,
but the publication of these same prices by Consumer Reports would likely merit full First
Amendment protection.”); Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace:
Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 433–34
(1971) (discussing the importance of First Amendment protection for commercial advertising).
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aimed solely at lawyers. On the contrary, the fact that the speaker is a
lawyer often justifies greater speech restrictions that government can,
and does, take into account. Restrictions on public employee speech
likewise can impose very significant limits, which the Roberts Court
121
In fact, all of Pyramid Four is potenhas emphatically reinforced.
tially imperiled by the argument that speaker identity-specific speech
restrictions lead to strict scrutiny, as is much of the terrain below the
elevated scrutiny line in Pyramid One. This is a huge potential shakeup of the free speech landscape.
If all regulation aimed at a subset of speakers on the same topic is
“speaker-identity” sensitive and therefore presumptively unconstitutional, then the courts will be very busy indeed determining if all of
these regulations can satisfy strict scrutiny. If one replies that this is
of little concern because all of the regulations will easily pass strict
122
scrutiny, then one either is assuming that all of this regulation is
narrowly tailored to advance a compelling government interest in
ways that meet strict scrutiny—a most dubious assumption—or one is
willing to dilute strict scrutiny to accommodate this wide range of
123
regulations. Strict in theory may not be fatal in fact; but as Justice
124
Kennedy himself has said recently, in another context, it still needs
to be strict.
In the free speech context, true strict scrutiny has been construed
125
In fact, Justice
to set an extremely high bar for the government.
Kennedy once wrote that in his view, content-based regulation of protected speech—which triggers strict scrutiny—should never be up126
held. Although this is not the law, it comes rather close given how
121
122

123
124
125

126

See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (holding that the First Amendment
does not insulate public employees from employer discipline); see generally supra note 97.
For example, Jane Bambauer argues that expanding the reach of free speech coverage to
data flow problems will not wreak havoc with the doctrine, and she describes fear that it
will do so as “far-fetched.” See Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 111
(2014).
Gunther, supra note 103, at 8 (explaining that there is minimal fact and scrutiny in “old”
equal protection).
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2421 (2013) (“Strict scrutiny must not be strict in
theory but feeble in fact.”).
For an especially rigorous display of strict scrutiny analysis in the First Amendment context, see Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536
U.S. 765, 783 (2002) (holding that a prohibition promulgated by the Minnesota Supreme
Court fails strict scrutiny because it is “woefully underinclusive”).
See id. at 793 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[C]ontent-based speech restrictions that do not
fall within any traditional exception should be invalidated without inquiry into narrow tailoring or compelling government interests.”). Yet, even Kennedy backed off of this firm
line when he joined the majority opinion in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.
Ct. 2705, 2730–31 (2010) (using a strict scrutiny analysis to conclude that it is not a viola-
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rare it is for the Court to uphold restrictions on speech that qualify
127
for full strict scrutiny under current law.
Here is my first point: the Court risks moving too much speech to
above-the-line, strict scrutiny treatment when it applies a presumption against speaker-identity distinctions that makes considerable
sense in some contexts to all contexts. This is a very unwise trend within the current case law that should be halted. If Citizens United stood
alone, one might view this concern as overstated. Given Sorrell, however, the concern is a real one, with potential tectonic consequences
for the huge body of below-the-line, or previously loosely scrutinized,
government regulation of expressive activity.
B. The “No New Exceptions” Renovation
In United States v. Stevens, the Court stated that it would be “startling and dangerous” to create new exceptions to strict scrutiny of
content-based restrictions on speech based on a “free-floating test for
First Amendment coverage” that relies upon “an ad hoc balancing of
128
Instead, the content-based rerelative social costs and benefits.”
strictions, “‘[a]s a general matter,’” must be confined to “‘historic
129
and traditional categories long familiar to the bar.’” The list of these categories is as follows: advocacy intended and likely to incite imminent lawless action, obscenity, defamation, speech integral to criminal conduct, fighting words, child pornography, fraud, true threats,
and “speech presenting some grave and imminent threat the government has the power to prevent, although a restriction under the
130
It is perhaps significant
last category is most difficult to sustain.”
that the Court did not include this last exception in its string of historic and traditional examples in Stevens. Rather, this example was
added two years later when the Court applied Stevens in United States
131
v. Alvarez.

127

128
129

130
131

tion of the freedom of speech to prohibit citizens from providing material support to terrorist groups).
See id. at 2730 (“[T]his is not to say that any future applications of the material-support
statute to speech or advocacy will survive First Amendment scrutiny . . . . [W]e in no way
suggest that a regulation of independent speech would pass constitutional muster, even if
the Government were to show that such speech benefits foreigh terrorist organizations.”).
130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585 (2010).
Id. at 1584 (quoting Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002); Simon & Schuster, Inc.
v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 127 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (internal citation omitted).
Id. (explaining that content-based speech restrictions include speech presenting threats
preventable by the Government).
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In rejecting the argument that new exceptions can be developed
based on case-by-case balancing, Chief Justice John Roberts noted
that “[t]he First Amendment itself reflects a judgment by the American people that the benefits of its restrictions on the Government
outweigh the costs. Our Constitution forecloses any attempt to revise
132
that judgment simply on the basis that some speech is not worth it.”
Therefore, the government’s argument that animal “crush videos”
deserve categorical treatment as low value speech failed. Depictions
of animal cruelty are not necessarily “an integral part of conduct in
133
violation of a valid criminal statute.”
The Chief Justice acknowledged that there may be “some categories of speech that have been historically unprotected, but have not
134
yet been specifically identified or discussed as such in our case law.”
But the clear and inflexible rule set forth in Stevens was that a categor135
That the Court
ical exception must be “historic and traditional.”
meant what it said in Stevens also is borne out by the Court’s invoca136
tion of this rule in two subsequent cases: Alvarez and Brown v. Enter137
Like depictions of animal cruelty,
tainment Merchants Asssociation.
lies about one’s military awards that are not hooked to concrete
138
harm and violent interactive videos sold to minors without parental
139
consent do not fall under any traditional and historical exception.
This in turn means that regulations aimed at such speech, in a content-specific way, trigger classic strict scrutiny under the First
Amendment.
This last absolute rule is arguably not as worrisome as a practical
matter as the first two; after all, there are many other ways to curb
even above-the-line speech that falls outside one of the traditional exceptions. But the rule plainly is a theoretical disaster. Why should
the balancing test the First Amendment allegedly already conducts be
132
133

134
135
136
137
138
139

Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1585.
Id. at 1586 (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761–62 (1982) (internal quotation
marks omitted)); see also id. (distinguishing regulation of child pornography on this basis).
Id.; see also id. (declining to carve out new categories of speech outside the scope of the
First Amendment).
Id. at 1584.
132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (finding invalid an act criminalizing false statements, which
had been made to claim military awards).
131 S. Ct. 2729, 2734 (2011) (extending Stevens to prevent creation of new categories).
See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2549 (explaining that offensive conduct alone is not sufficient to
warrant regulation of protected speech).
See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2735–36 (2011) (“No doubt a State possesses legitimate power to
protect children from harm, but that does not include a free-floating power to restrict the
ideas to which children may be exposed.”) (internal citation omitted).
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a one-way ratchet? Does Stevens mean no new exceptions to full First
Amendment protection for speech that falls above the current line,
and no more migration of speech from below-the-line to above-the-line status?
If so, how does the migration of commercial speech from “unprotected” to protected, under Central Hudson limits, fit this mandate? For
that matter, how do we justify robust, modern protection for seditious
libel? Or for defamation leveled at a public figure? If not, then what
is the role of First Amendment history here—which of course began
with application solely to the federal government and not to state and
local governments?
Why should public employees (and perhaps public school children) have any freedom of speech at work (or at school)? Why ask
mock questions during oral arguments that press the “original intent”
point on the ground that the Justice is asking—foolishly—what James
140
Madison thought about violent videos?
Finally, and more fundamentally, how exactly do we decide if
speech that falls outside a traditional exception, and is therefore subject to elevated scrutiny, is “protected speech” without conducting
case-by-case balancing of the harm of the speech weighed against its
value? The self-assured “no new exceptions” language ignores the
dynamic judicial interpretation process, post-1925, that led to a greatly expanded application of the First Amendment—to include regulations of state and local governments via the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment—and a greatly expanded scope of the freedoms it confers. It also ignores the basic structure of Pyramid One,
which shows how much expression currently lies below the line of elevated scrutiny. If the logic of Stevens holds, then the Pyramid is now
fossilized. This may lend some stability to the doctrine; but to bind
future courts to this close-ended commitment is impossible to square
with significant swaths of the First Amendment work of the Court pre2010.
Here is my second point: the Court in Stevens foolishly introduced
an ostensibly history- and tradition-based hard brake on the categorical exceptions within free speech doctrine without adequately considering the wider, logical, and normative implications of doing this.
By strictly cabining the exceptions, it also placed a lot of stress on
strict scrutiny, just as it did with its line in the sand rule about speaker-identity in Sorrell and Citizens United. This is another potentially
140

See Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729
(2011) (No. 08-1448) (“[W]hat Justice Scalia wants to know is what James Madison
thought about video games”); cf. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2729 (2011) (holding that video
games are protected under the First Amendment).

Nov. 2014]

TREAD ON ME!

401

significant flaw in the free speech architecture because it allows too
little room for growth, changed circumstances, and evolving wisdom.
C. The Government Speech Renovation
In Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, the Court held that when the
government is the speaker, the First Amendment does not apply at
141
all, apart from Establishment Clause limits on government speech.
In the words of Justice Samuel Alito, “[t]he Free Speech Clause restricts government regulation of private speech; it does not regulate
142
The Court in Summum relied on an earlier
government speech.”
case involving compelled subsidies for Government advertising messages, in which the Court stated that the Government’s own speech is
143
“exempt from First Amendment scrutiny.”
Like the foregoing close-ended statements about speaker-specific
restrictions on speech and no new exceptions, this absolute statement
about government speech is either not meant to be as absolute as it
sounds, or constitutes a very worrisome gap in free speech protection.
It surely is hard to square with the free speech logic that undergirds
the prohibition on speaker-identity restrictions: government information is of enormous value to “decision-making in democracy.” To
place government power over that information and its presentation
to the public wholly beyond the First Amendment’s reach is a very
scary proposition.
One can readily appreciate the problem of judicial secondguessing of the millions of value-laden choices that government
144
makes daily in the form of speech. Yet experience with government
power over “its” speech, and how it can slide from persuasion to
145
propaganda, from bully pulpit to billy club, should make us all wary
of unlimited government power over the vast sea of information that
the government creates, controls, interprets, and yes—spins.
The problem goes even deeper into constitutional logic. The
Court long ago declared that as a general matter, only government

141
142
143
144

145

555 U.S. 460, 467–68 (2009); see id. (explaining that government speech must comport
with the Establishment Clause).
Id.
Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005).
The problem of judicial capacity as it relates to doctrinal development has been beautifully explored by Andrew Coan. See Andrew B. Coan, Judicial Capacity and the Substance of
Constitutional Law, 122 YALE L.J. 422, 424–58 (2012).
See MAGEDAH E. SHABO, TECHNIQUES OF PROPAGANDA AND PERSUASION 116 (2008) (discussing the negative uses of propaganda); see also infra note 242.
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can violate our federal constitutional rights;146 thus, only “state action”
triggers the First Amendment. Government restrictions on its own
speech do not fit neatly into the basic rule that only government action
that burdens private parties’ liberty mobilizes constitutional liberty
147
concerns.
Yet just as we know that private parties can exercise frightening,
channel-choking power over information without governmental par148
ticipation or direct endorsement—think Google —we know government can exercise similarly scary power without directly regulating any private party. To place either actor completely beyond the
First Amendment may serve constitutional formalist logic, but it also
leaves us impoverished in ways that are best described as First
Amendment losses.
Within state action doctrine, the point is especially vivid in Marsh
v. Alabama: even though the private company owned the whole town,
this did not mean that a Jehovah’s Witness had no constitutional
right to engage in expressive activity on the streets of that “private
149
Rather, the Court treated the private company as the govtown.”
ernment because of its pervasive control over ostensibly municipal
functions; the private entity, in Marsh, was tantamount to the gov150
ernment because it engaged in a “public function.”
Correlatively, freedom of speech doctrine also should include an
exception to the “government speech” doctrine for the rare circumstances in which the government exerts so much expressive power that
its actions are tantamount to direct speech regulation. This much
free speech breathing room is worth preserving, despite the general
and sensible assumption that government may engage in contentand even viewpoint-specific regulation of its own speech, with virtually no First Amendment brakes. One factor, though not the only one,
that should be relevant to determining the contours of this caveat is
the extent to which government has monopoly power over the in146
147

148

149
150

The notable exception is the Thirteenth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
I will set aside here the liberty-based argument in favor of “states’ rights.” See Bond v.
United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2360 (2011) (finding that an individual has standing to
challenge a federal statute’s validity on the grounds that it infringes upon rights reserved
to states).
See Bambauer, supra note 36, at 919 (recognizing that while Google has great power over
information, it does not operate in “near governmental fashion” as the company towns
did in cases such as Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946)); see also Rosen, supra note 36,
at 69 (describing a future hypothetical feature of Facebook allowing users to track each
other walking around via live-streaming public “camera networks”).
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946) (explaining that private ownership does not
preclude access to fundamental liberties unfer the First Amendment).
Id. at 506–09.
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formation in question. The lack of options matters. We might think
we have a choice of horses, but when Thomas Hobson runs the only
stable in town, our horse is always the horse that Hobson selects.
Summum, weirdly, ignores this concern. I say “weirdly” because
151
the Roberts Court has been viewed as exceptionally pro-speech, and
because the more conservative justices in particular worry openly
about the ways in which government may constrain private choices.
Consider, for example, how outraged Justice Alito was in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, where he exclaimed that there is “no freedom
for expression that offends prevailing standards of political correct152
ness in our country’s institutions of higher learning.” Why should
“political correctness” allegedly inculcated by one set of government
actors be so outrageous, but not other forms or the same form of “indoctrination” performed without direct subsidies or regulation?
I have no difficulty with the case law that presumes, even in cases
that involve subsidies to private parties, or direct regulation of their
behavior, that government usually gets to control its own property,
funds, and messages. But even a little splash of legal realism is
enough to wake us up to how government can achieve its viewpointnarrow ends without direct regulation of individuals or conditions on
grants, simply by speaking stentorianly in its own voice.
Here is my third point: Summum moves too much speech categorically below the line, forever. It is imprudently and unnecessarily absolute, in ways that violate the Court’s own sense of the primary value of
freedom of expression.
D. Summary: Misunderstanding Doctrine and Theory
The Court is on the wrong path in these cases. The tension between what it says in them, and what it has done elsewhere (and likely
will do in the future) is completely untenable. It is too enamored by
the most aspirational statements about the First Amendment in some
of them, too willing to substitute aphorisms for analysis in all of them,
and too reluctant to lift to plain view the balancing test that actually
informs its choices in any of them.

151

152

However, these appearances can be deceiving. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Not a Free Speech
Court, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 723, 724–25 (2011) (discussing the Roberts Court rulings against
free speech claims).
130 S. Ct. 2971, 3000 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting).
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On the contrary, it harshly chides litigants who attempt to make
153
the doctrinal balance between speech harms and benefits explicit.
At the same time, it banishes an entire, extremely powerful category
of speech to First Amendment irrelevance, with alarmingly little room
for reconsideration in a future worst-case-scenario.
Instead, it should have embraced a more pragmatic, incrementalist, and methodological approach that better tracks the messy doctrinal reality—without sacrificing free speech passion or analytical rigor.
E. The Court’s Compelled Speech Cases
A particularly complex area of free speech law—compelled
speech—illustrates quite vividly the wisdom of doctrinal pragmatism.
These cases are a rich, trans-substantive zone of sticky speech regulation dilemmas that trigger bipartisan anxieties about government
power, and they are an area in which the Roberts Court recently revealed that it can write opinions that are notably and refreshingly
elastic and realistic.
In Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International, Inc. (“AID”), Chief Justice Roberts embraced the soaring
“fixed star” rhetoric of Justice Robert Jackson in West Virginia State
154
Board of Education v. Barnette, to strike down a condition on a federal
155
grant that restricted the free speech of grant recipients. Yet it also
acknowledged the analytical messiness and doctrinal fluidity of the
compelled speech case law. In the latter respect, the case was surprising and—I argue—a turn in the right direction.
1. Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International, Inc.
The Court in AID overturned government conditions on access to
federal funding that required recipients to adopt a “policy explicitly
opposing prostitution” and prohibited recipients from engaging in
156
any activities inconsistent with an anti-prostitution stance. The fed153
154

155
156

See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585 (2010) (explaining that the benefits of First Amendment restrictios on the Government outweigh the costs).
319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (stating that “[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official . . . can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion”).
133 S. Ct. 2321, 2332 (2013).
Id. at 2325–32 (striking down the condition on freedom of speech grounds).
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eral program in question aimed at reducing HIV/AIDS behavioral
risks, and conditioned funding on two conditions: first, no funds
made available to carry out the law “may be used to promote or advocate the legalization or practice of prostitution or sex trafficking”;
and second, no funds could “provide assistance to any group or organization that does not have a policy explicitly opposing prostitution
157
and sex trafficking.” The second condition was the condition that
was challenged by program fund recipients, who argued that the
adoption of such a policy would make it more difficult for them to
158
work with prostitutes in the fight against HIV/AIDS.
The Court in AID set forth the following standard for unconstitutional conditions on funding: “the relevant distinction . . . is between
conditions that define the limits of the government spending program—those that specify the activities Congress wants to subsidize—
and conditions that seek to leverage funding to regulate speech out159
It then openly acknowlside the contours of the program itself.”
edged that “[t]he line is hardly clear, in part because the definition of a
particular program can always be manipulated to subsume the challenged
160
condition.”
In a subsequent passage, the Court admitted (with remarkable
understatement) that the distinction it has drawn “between conditions that define the federal program and those that reach outside it”
161
is “not always self-evident.” Chief Justice Roberts invoked Justice Benjamin Cardozo—an intellectual leader of evolutionary or dynamic
162
said
that
constitutional
interpretation
adherents —who
163
“[d]efinition more precise must abide the wisdom of the future.”
Chief Justice Roberts expressed “confiden[ce] that the Policy Re164
quirement [fell] on the unconstitutional side of the line,” but surrounded this assurance with apparent humility about judicial capacity
to impose categorical order on this area of speech doctrine.

157
158
159
160
161
162

163
164

Id. at 2326 (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 7631(e)–(f)).
Id.
Id. at 2328.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 2330 (emphasis added).
See CARDOZO, supra note 5, at 17 (noting that “[t]he great generalities of the constitution
have a content and significance that vary from age to age” and outlining the elements of a
common law method of constitutional decision-making).
Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 591 (1937).
Agency for Int’l Dev., 133 S. Ct. at 2330.
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The Court distinguished prior conditional funding decisions, such
165
as Rust v. Sullivan, on the ground that the funding condition in AID
166
reached beyond the scope of the funded program. The program in
Rust was defined by Congress up front to encourage only selected
family planning methods. The grantees also were not restricted from
engaging in abortion advocacy outside the scope of the funded program; they were only prohibited from engaging in abortion advocacy
167
on the funded job.
The policy requirement in AID, in contrast, was not merely a selection criterion for grant recipients who would further the program’s ends. This legitimate government goal was already protected
by the first condition on funding, i.e. that no funds “be used to promote or advocate the legalization or practice of prostitution or sex
168
trafficking.” Adding the second condition—requiring adoption of
a policy against prostitution—took this limit one step further: it
compelled grant recipients to affirmatively “adopt—as their own—the
Government’s view on an issue of public concern” in a way that went
169
beyond the scope of the Program. This was a restraint on the grantee,
not the program or service it provided with federal funds. Chief Justice Roberts therefore viewed the case as more comparable to FCC v.
League of Women Voters of California, which struck down a condition on
federal funding to noncommercial broadcast television and radio sta170
That
tions that prohibited editorializing, even with private funds.
condition went beyond assuring that no federal funds went to editorializing; it leveraged the funding to “regulate the stations’ speech
171
outside the scope of the program.”
In AID, the condition likewise went too far. Even if the grantee
had an affiliate that could express the disfavored views, and even
though a potential grantee could “just say no” to the funds, demanding adoption of the policy as a condition of funding was an impermis165

166
167
168

169
170
171

500 U.S. 173 (1991); see id. at 195 n.4 (“Congress’ power to allocate funds for public purposes includes an ancillary power to ensure that those funds are properly applied to the
prescribed use.”).
Agency for Int’l Dev., 133 S. Ct. at 2329–30 (analyzing the Court’s finding in Rust that a
condition on funding in Title X was not unconstitutional under the First Amendment).
See id. (analyzing Rust).
Id. at 2324, 2326 (quoting The Leadership Act, 22 U.S.C.A. § 7631(e) (West 2008), declared unconstitutional by Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct.
2321 (2013)).
Agency for Int’l Dev., 133 S. Ct. at 2330.
468 U.S. 364 (1984).
Agency for Int’l Dev., 133 S. Ct. at 2329 (discussing the Court’s treatment of a condition on
federal financial assistance in FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, 468 U.S. 364, 399
(1984)).
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sible restraint on the grantee’s freedom of expression.172 Unconstitutional conditions on funding are not restricted to situations in which
a “condition is actually coercive, in the sense of an offer that cannot
173
be refused.” Rather, the distinction drawn in prior cases is “not so
174
limited.”
The policy requirement thus went “beyond preventing recipients
from using private funds in a way that would undermine the federal
program. It require[d] them to pledge allegiance to the Government’s
175
policy of eradicating prostitution.” This was compelled affirmation
of belief not confined to the scope of the funded government program. In short, impermissible government compulsion comes in
many forms, and is not limited to cases of actual coercion. One of
those forms—but not the only one—is the leveraging of funding to
regulate speech outside the contours of the program itself.
2. Doctrinal Backdrop to AID
The Court in AID invoked the oft-quoted and facially absolutist
language from Barnette: “[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their
176
But the Court acknowledged that the whole First
faith therein.”
Amendment story is hardly consistent with this stirring “no indoctri177
nation” passage.
A moment’s reflection on the wide range of circumstances in
which government can, and does, prescribe what is orthodox in matters of public opinion and compel individual speech makes clear that
even this most cherished liberal right to resist orthodoxy bows often to
democratic reality. Distinguishing between permissible and impermissible government coercion requires nuance and a willingness to
bend speech principles to accommodate conflicting political, historical, and other regulatory realities.
For example, consider the following “compelled speech” scenarios:

172
173
174
175
176
177

Agency for Int’l Dev., 133 S. Ct. at 2328–30.
Id. at 2328.
Id.
Id. at 2332 (emphasis added).
Id. (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642, (1943)).
Id. at 2330.
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 Government requires physicians to offer counseling to terminal178

ly ill patients about available palliative care.

Government conditions Medicare funding on recipients’ compliance with rules regarding disclosure of treatment options to
179
patients.
Government requires commercial speech to include “purely factual and uncontroversial information,” if it is “reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consum180
ers.”
Government requires that a graphic image be included on tobacco product packaging to warn consumers of health dangers
181
of smoking.
Government requires that cell phone retailers post certain informational posters developed by the Department of the Envi182
ronment that warn of health dangers of cell phones.
Government requires that doctors warn abortion patients that
the procedure puts them at “increased risk of suicide ideation
183
and suicide.”
Government requires that any organization that provides information about pregnancy-related services and does not pro178
179
180
181

182

183

N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2997-c(2) (McKinney 2012).
Medicare Condition of Participation: Patient’s Rights, 42 C.F.R. § 482.13(b) (2010).
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651
(1985).
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 201.4(d), 123
Stat. 1776, 1845 (2009). But see R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food and Drug Admin., 696
F.3d 1205, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2012), overruled by Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760
F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (striking down a rulemaking made pursuant to the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act on compelled speech grounds).
See, e.g., CTIA—The Wireless Ass’n v. City and County of San Francisco, 827 F. Supp. 2d
1054, 1057 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (upholding requirement that cell phone retailers provide
consumers with informational fact-sheets prepared by San Francisco Department of the
Environment regarding potential health effects of cell phone use).
E.g., Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v. Rounds, 686 F.3d
889, 892–94 (8th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (upholding South Dakota law requiring that physicians provide an abortion patient with a written description of medical risks and statistically significant risk factors of the procedure); cf. Conan v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629 (9th Cir.
2002) (holding government policy of investigating physicians who recommend use of marijuana to patients violated free speech of physicians); Stuart v. Loomis, 992 F. Supp. 2d
585 (M.D.N.C. 2014) (striking down “speech and display” provision that required doctors
to display ultrasound images and describe them to patient). See generally Robert C. Post,
Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007
U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 948 (distinguishing between speech “by a professional” and “professional speech”).
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vide information about abortions or certain types of birth control post a conspicuous sign in the waiting room notifying clients that it “does not provide or make referral for abortion or
184
birth-control services.”
Government bans therapies by mental health providers designed to change minors’ sexual orientations, including efforts
to “change behaviors or gender expressions, or to eliminate or
reduce sexual or romantic attractions or feelings toward indi185
viduals of the same sex.”
Government prohibits a web-site owner from posting trade secrets on his Internet Website, where he knows or has reason to
know the secrets were acquired by improper means, i.e. through
reverse engineering in violation of a license agreement that
186
deals with content scrambling technology of DVDs.
Government denies registered student organization status to law
student organizations that do not comply with an “all-comers”
187
anti-discrimination policy.

184

185

186

187

The Evergreen Ass’n v. City of New York, 740 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, No. 131462, 2014 WL 2586961 (U.S. Nov. 3, 2014); Greater Baltimore Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 721 F.3d 264, 271 (4th Cir. 2013).
S. 1172, 2011-2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012), available at https://leginfo.legislature.ca.
gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201120120SB1172; Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d
1208, 1221–23 (9th Cir. 2013). See generally Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally
Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted
Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277 (2005) (discussing the First Amendment tensions in
some regulation of professional speech).
DVD Copy Control Ass’n v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1, 8–10 (Cal. 2003) (upholding a grant of
injunctive relief under California trade secret laws on ground that the law in question
served significant state interests, burdened no more speech than necessary to serve these
interests, and did not contribute significantly to any public debate about use of encryption software or DVD industry efforts to limit unauthorized copying of DVDs); see also
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 532–33 (2001) (addressing the constitutionality of statutes that punish the disclosure of illegally intercepted communications, and distinguishing between matters of public versus purely private concern). See generally Richard A. Epstein, Privacy, Publication, and the First Amendment: The Dangers of First Amendment
Exceptionalism, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1003 (2000) (arguing in favor of common law protection
of trade secrets); Rodney A. Smolla, Information as Contraband: The First Amendment and
Liability for Trafficking in Speech, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1099 (2002) (analyzing Supreme Court
cases that address tension between freedom of expression and use of illegally intercepted
communications).
Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 669–73 (2010). See generally Toni M. Massaro, Christian Legal Society v. Martinez: Six Frames, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 569 (2011)
(using the decision in Martinez to analyze the government’s right to condition funds while
being limited by the sometimes conflicting goals of diversity and freedom of expression).
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Government requires all students who attend a public university
in that state to pay a student-activity fee, which supports a range
188
of student organizations.
Government requires colleges and universities that receive federal funding to allow military recruiters onto their campuses on
189
same terms as recruiters for other employers.
Government applies anti-fraud laws to religious actors seeking
190
financial contributions.
Government requires individuals who sign ballot proposition
191
petitions to reveal their identity.
Government requires public high school students to wear ID
badges, which include photos and names of the students, barcodes tied to students’ social security numbers, and radio frequency identification chips that pinpoint the exact location of
192
the individual students, including after school.
Government requires a public middle school student to reveal
her Facebook password after posting a message about an adult
193
hall monitor at her school.
Government requires individuals who engage in door-to-door
solicitation to first register with the local authorities and obtain
194
an identification badge.
Government bans the sale or disclosure by pharmacies of information regarding the prescribing habits of doctors when the
information would be used for marketing purposes by pharma195
ceutical manufacturers.

188

189

190
191
192
193
194
195

See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 221 (2000)
(upholding student activity fee to facilitate extracurricular speech, provided the program
was viewpoint neutral and neutrally applied).
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 59–60 (2006)
(upholding a conditional spending requirement mandating that law schools who receive
certain federal funds afford equal access to military recruiters).
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 79 (1944).
See, e.g., John Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 190–91 (2011) (upholding Washington
state public records disclosure law, on facial challenge).
See, e.g., A.H. v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 916 F. Supp. 2d 757, 761–62 (W.D. Tex.
2013).
E.g., R.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist., 894 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1133–34 (D. Minn. 2012).
See, e.g., Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of New York, Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S.
150, 154–56 (2002).
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011).
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Government imposes criminal sanctions for the promotion by a
drug salesperson of an FDA-approved prescription drug for “off196
label” uses.
Government bans physicians from prescribing an FDA-approved
drug, except in the dosage and manner prescribed by the FDA
197
in 2000.
Government requires private parties to subsidize an advertising
198
campaign for certain agricultural products.
Government requires public employees to pay an annual fee to
cover the costs of the union’s collective bargaining activities, but
allows dissenting nonmembers of the union to affirmatively object to dues deductions used for political activities rather than
requiring that all nonmembers opt in to this use of union
199
dues.
Government requires individuals arrested for serious crimes to
200
produce a DNA sample
Government requires commercial photographers that operate
places of public accommodation to respect non-discrimination
201
laws that prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation.

196

197

198

199

200
201

See, e.g., United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 168–69 (2d Cir. 2012); Michelle M. Mello
et al., Shifting Terrain in the Regulation of Off-Label Promotion of Pharmaceuticals, 360 NEW
ENG. J. MEDICINE 1557, 1561 (2009), available at http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/michellemello/files/2012/10/Off-label_PDF.pdf.
See, e.g., Okla. Coal. for Reprod. Justice v. Cline, 292 P.3d 27, 27–28 (Okla. 2012) (per
curiam) (citing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992) to hold that a statute, which prohibited the reckless or knowing prescription of
abortifacient medication, was facially unconstitutional).
Compare Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 477 (1997) (upholding
federal marketing program that subsidized ad campaign for California fruit), with United
States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 413 (2001) (striking down compelled subsidization of advertising program aimed at promoting mushrooms). See generally Johanns v.
Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 562 (2005) (upholding a requirement that cattle
producers subsidize ads for beef, on the ground that this was “government speech,” not
private expression).
Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2295 (2012) (holding that
there must be an opt-in, not merely opt-out, mechanism for distributing dues deductions
from wages of non-union members to union political activities); cf. Harris v. Quinn, 134 S.
Ct. 2618 (2014) (holding First Amendment prohibited collection of an agency fee from
“partial public employee” home health care workers).
Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013).
Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 59 (N.M. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.
1787 (2014) (holding a commercial photography business could not refuse to photograph same-sex commitment ceremony based on personal religious objections to samesex marriage).
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In all of the above cases, and in countless more,202 the government is
actively involved in shaping, prohibiting, or outright compelling
speech. Predicting when a court will conclude that the scenario
crosses the First Amendment line is extremely difficult, even if one
knows the doctrinal results in all of the above examples.
This is all entirely unsurprising, given the Janus-faced principles
that the Court has invoked in compelled speech cases.
On the one hand, the Court has said that “the right of freedom of
thought . . . includes both the right to speak freely and the right to
203
It also has upheld the right not to
refrain from speaking at all.”
disclose one’s identity, in some contexts, as part of this right to re204
Yet it has upheld numerous demands that
frain from speaking.
205
speakers disclose their identity when this is necessary to protect
consumers, the integrity of electoral processes, or other important
government objectives.
202

201
202

203

See, e.g., Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 814 F. Supp. 2d 1367 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (striking down on
free speech grounds Florida’s “Firearm Owners’ Privacy Act,” which forbade doctors from
including information about patients’ firearm ownership in medical records, asking patients whether they own firearms, unless relevant to patients’ medical care, or discriminating against patients because they own a firearm), rev’d, Wollschlaeger v. Florida, 760 F.3d
1195 (11th Cir. 2014).
The complexities of mandatory disclosures and disclaimers in the context of campaign finance and electoral process cases are beyond the scope of this article but are
clearly relevant to the more general question of whether government can compel expression. See infra notes 204–05. The problem is also pervasive within the area of constitutional limits on public employee discipline. See generally Paul M. Secunda, The (Neglected)
Importance of Being Lawrence: The Constitutionalization of Public Employee Rights to Decisional
Non-Interference in Private Affairs, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85 (2006) (discussing the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in the context of public employment). A rapidly emerging
free speech conundrum lies ahead for the Securities Exchange Commission, among other agencies, which is facing First Amendment challenges of some of its disclosure regimes. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. S.E.C., 748 F.3d 359, 364 (D.C. Cir. 2014), overruled by
Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (invalidating a requirement that companies use specific language when regulated entities declare that
their products “have not been found to be DRC conflict free,” on compelled speech
grounds); cf. Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (affirming lower court
order that the industry is unlikely to succeed on free speech claims, and objecting to federal country-of-origin labeling requirements for “muscle cuts” of meats).
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (citation omitted).
See Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182 (1999) (holding a requirement that initiative-petition circulators wear identification badges unconstitutional);
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (holding a prohibition on distribution of anonymous campaign literature unconstitutional); Talley v. California, 362
U.S. 60 (1960) (holding a ban on anonymous handbills unconstitutional); see also Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Scranton, 536 U.S. 150, 166–67 (2002)
(holding a village ordinance prohibiting canvassers from going in and on private residential property too broad and thus unconstitutional).
See, e.g., Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186 (2010) (holding that a state requirement that petition
signers disclose their identities constitutional).
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On the one hand, the Court has stated that “First Amendment
values are at serious risk if the government can compel a particular
citizen, or discrete group of citizens, to pay special subsidies for
206
Yet it has upheld requirements
speech on the side that it favors.”
that effectively compel expression through mandatory assessments
207
for government sponsored ad campaigns, on the ground that the
assessments were “ancillary to a more comprehensive program re208
stricting marketing autonomy.”
On the one hand, the Court has said that conditioning a government benefit on forgoing speech is “in effect to penalize them for
209
such speech.” Yet it has said that a mere refusal to fund speech is
not a burden on expression where there is “no indication that the
statute was intended to suppress any ideas or any demonstration that
210
Put another way, “[g]overnment
it has had that effect.”
can . . . selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it
believes to be in the public interest, without at the same time funding
an alternative program which seeks to deal with the problem in an211
other way.”
In fact, in most cases, the “just turn down the money” response to
claims that conditions on benefits are coercive proves to be dispositive. But there are exceptions, as AID and other cases prove.
The Court’s “yes, but” doctrinal statements have led to important
critiques, many on the ground that the outcome in the specific case
cannot be squared with outcomes in other cases, which in turn often
212
leads to indictments of the entire area of law as unprincipled. This
lack of order, though, is unremarkable when one realizes that the
compelled speech problem is but one piece of the larger and intractable “unconstitutional conditions” conundrum.
Nor is the right answer “more formalism” or stricter tests to constrain judicial balancing—as tempting as that may be. Even the most
heroic efforts of scholars to assist judges in forging one clear path

204
205
206
207
208
209
210

United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 411 (2001).
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, 521 U.S. 457 (1997) (holding that assessments for
generic advertising do not amount to a restriction of free speech).
United Foods, 533 U.S. at 411–12 (distinguishing Glickman).
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958).
Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 548 (1983).
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991).
See, e.g., Robert Post, Transparent and Efficient Markets: Compelled Commercial Speech and Coerced Commercial Association in United Foods, Zauderer, and Abood, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 555,
557–58 (2006) (critiquing case law on compelled commercial speech).
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through this constitutional thicket have failed, and no theorist drawn
213
to these seductive rocks has survived unbruised.
A primary reason for the muddle is that there are “Unconstitu214
As Fred Schauer has obtional Conditions Questions Everywhere.”
served, “what looks like an unconstitutional condition from one angle
may look strikingly like government speech, or government support
215
of its own activities and policies, from another.” This makes reconciling the cases “too hard,” and the search for consistency a “chime216
ra.” There also are compelled speech questions everywhere, and the
search for consistency among them is likewise a chimera. What looks
like compelled speech from one angle may look strikingly like government speech, or government regulation of conduct, or promotion
of sensible government regulatory policy, from another. Even the
famous Holmes adage that one cannot cry fire falsely in a crowded
theater is a form of compelled speech insofar as compelled silence is
viewed as a burden on expressive autonomy. Moreover, stare decisis—among other factors—operates as a huge constraint on analytical
purity.
Regulation aimed at professional or expert expression nicely illustrates these points: when do these regulations permissibly require a
person to curb or shape his or her professional or expert speech to
conform to professional standards, versus impermissibly “affirm ideo217
This in turn, of
logical truths to which they might well object”?
course, begs another question: well, when are professional standards
themselves unduly “ideological?”
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213
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For especially influential efforts to make sense of the doctrine, see Lynn A. Baker, The
Prices of Rights: Toward a Positive Theory of Unconstitutional Conditions, 75 CORNELL L. REV.
1185, 1216–20 (1990); Richard A. Epstein, Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 26–28 (1988); Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights In A Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1378–
95 (1984); Robert M. O’Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits With Strings Attached, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 443, 444 (1966); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions,
102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1499–1505 (1989). For more pointed skepticism about the doctrine itself, see Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is an Anachronism (With Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593, 595–608
(1990); Cass R. Sunstein, Is There an Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine?, 26 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 337, 339–42 (1989).
Adam B. Cox & Adam M. Samaha, Unconstitutional Conditions Questions Everywhere: The
Implications of Exit and Sorting for Constitutional Law and Theory, 5 J. OF LEGAL ANALYSIS 61,
(2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2186423 (discussing exit and sorting dynamics in constitutional litigation).
Schauer, supra note 118, at 102.
Frederick Schauer, Too Hard: Unconstitutional Conditions and the Chimera of Constitutional
Consistency, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 989 (1995) (exploring views of constitutional ontology).
Post, supra note 183, at 959.
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The questions quickly turn Escher-like. When can a professional
regulatory body claim that there is sufficient scientific or other evidence to justify the compelled speech? Which is to say, when is the
regulation not promoted by a desire to suppress knowledge? Are there
ever speech-suppressive measures that may not also suppress
knowledge? If so, how do we square such measures with the First
Amendment assumptions that there is no such thing as a false idea,
that the best remedy for bad speech is counter speech (if there be
time), or that we should just avert our eyes in the face of bad speech?
How do we reconcile such a conclusion or justification for speech
regulation—content– and speaker-specific regulation at that!—with
the First Amendment’s underlying commitment to an ever-evolving
construction of “truth,” including truth as it relates to professional
standards? Why not just say instead that one man’s quackery is another’s sound medical treatment?
Courts may draw a line between speech by a professional and professional speech to help understand the doctrinal decisions about the
line between free speech and permissible professional regulation that
we already have. Speech by a psychotherapist in her office is different from speech on the same topic by the psychotherapist on the
street corner. But this does not solve the problem of free speech limits within the former context, and it does not explain what the precise
218
First Amendment differences between the two contexts should be.
F. Common Factors, Common Questions?
Navigating this thicket requires a compass, not a map. It also requires a healthy respect for paradox within constitutional law. Yet,
although the cases are gnarly, courts do ask common questions that inform their hard choices.
216

The free speech lines become even muddier when the person is a minister or other religious official, who may be providing counseling that will have as great of an impact on the
person being counseled as would a psychotherapist. There are independent, constitutional reasons why ordinary malpractice rules do not apply to religious officials who engage in mental health “quackery,” but they are not obviously free speech, versus freedom
of religion, lines. In fact, affording religious speakers greater speech protection than
non-religious speakers should excite concern about speaker-identity discrimination, if
viewed through the free speech lens alone. A related problem of religious speaker exceptionalism surfaces in consumer fraud scenarios, where courts struggle to balance religious
freedoms with consumer protection laws. See, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78
(1944); see also Bernadette Meyler, Commerce in Religion, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 887, 898–
901 (2009) (discussing Ballard and the insulation of some commercial religious speech
from typical fraud rules). This problem is sure to get even gnarlier, post Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014), which extended Religious Freedom Restoration
Act coverage to for-profit businesses.
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Within the vast terrain covered by the “compelled speech” problem and the often conflicting first principles and contextual caveats,
several common factors and questions surface throughout the doctrine. Each falls on a continuum, with government power to require
the expression stronger on the left side than on the right side of the
continuum.
Toward Government Power

Against Government Power

Idenity-only disclosure

More detailed information disclosure

Selectively disclosed information

Secret-to-all information

Public Information

Private information

Memorialized data production

Affirmative oral recitation of
government script

Expert technical information

Non-expert, non-technical information

Objective content

Subjective content

Secular content

Religious content

Factual information

Ideological information

Information that can be detected
in the speaker

Information that must be extracted from the speaker

Compelled silence

Compelled expression

Government as an option

Government monopolization

Conditions of participation in a
government program

General prohibitions beyond the
scope of the government program

Consistent with the normal functioning of the speaker

A distortion of the normal functioning of the speaker
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Proportional to the scope of the
program

Beyond the program conditions

Prevention of direct harms to
third parties

Indirect or diffuse harms to others

Prevention of physical harms

Cognitive effects

Government objective of persuasion

Government objective of inculcation

Choice-facilitating government
objective

Choice-narrowing government
objective

Controlled government setting

“Street corner” setting

Public accommodation regulation

Private setting regulation

Neutrally applied regulation

Selectively applied regulation

Expressive conduct

Pure speech

Traditional area of government
regulation

Novel area of government regulation

Commercial speaker

Non-commercial speaker

Minor speaker

Adult speaker

Government’s own speech

Individual speech

219

These factors, rather than bright line tests or stirring quotations
from Barnette, therefore best describe the extant case law on compelled speech. They also show why efforts to capture all of them within one non-permeable, theoretical membrane falter. Even if one
could explain the left side of the list as a normatively coherent set of
concerns, the right side must be squared with that account. Moreover, we obviously may disagree about whether some expression falls
219

The list is non-exhaustive.
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on the left versus right side of the line in many cases. Debates about
“informed consent” in abortion cases or about the limits of nondiscrimination laws, for example, illustrate how slippery the “ideological versus factual” distinction can be. Consequently, the best answer
to the question of whether government constitutionally can “compel
our allegiance” is neither unitary nor unequivocal: “[i]t depends.”
As a normative matter, of course, where we draw the line between
impermissible and permissible compulsion matters greatly. Paternalism rankles. We value autonomous decision making, fear government overreaching, and exalt notions of democratic processes prem220
ised on an engaged and competent citizenry, even if they are myths.
We are not—at least not ideally or theoretically—government sock
221
puppets. The left line shows this, and calls to mind the factors that
inspire our greatest liberalism-based concerns about government
power to compromise these norms. The conventional theories that
support freedom of expression all play a role in the left-line emphasis
on skepticism about compelled speech, though none by itself captures all of them or—and this matters—their limits.
But the right side reminds us that we also are government, which
means we can be conscripted into making government work effectively through us, in various roles that are sometimes heavily regulated. It
also reminds us that there are competing speech-based values in most
freedom of speech conversations, and that restricting a speaker’s
freedom sometimes will enhance the audience or future speaker’s
understanding. We therefore often accept right-side limits on speaker autonomy without First Amendment grumbling, even without First
Amendment notice, and even with First Amendment enthusiasm.
Finally, the right line cautions us about viewing social problems
with only a free speech lens in hand. The practical upshot of the
competing tugs is the doctrine we have, with its common questions
but also its complex and at times internally contradictory answers.
1. Back to AID
Contrast the inflexibility of the three Roberts Court rules critiqued in Part I—speaker-identity distinctions always trigger elevated
scrutiny, no new categorical exceptions, and no free speech limits on

220
221

See ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE: WHY SMALLER GOVERNMENT IS
SMARTER 17–37 (2013), for a recent, chilling account of how ignorant we are.
My colleague Derek Bambauer’s delightful phrase.
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government speech—with the majority opinion in Agency for Interna222
tional Development v. Alliance for Open Society International.
True, the Court began its opinion with hornbook, hard-to-takecompletely-seriously, law: “[i]t is . . . a basic First Amendment principle that ‘freedom of speech prohibits the government from telling
223
people what they must say.’” As we have seen, this is just not true in
many circumstances.
But the Court also recognized that a direct prohibition on speech
is very different from government funding conditioned on compli224
In
ance with specific, value-laden limits on the use of the funds.
general, a party who objects to the conditions can merely refuse to
accept the government funds. When a party has a choice, however
constrained, it is much harder to claim that its speech is compelled by
the government.
Most importantly, the Court in AID recognized that the constitutional matter is not so black-and-white. AID set forth one factor for
determining when conditions on funding cross the free speech line,
i.e. conditions that restrict a grantee off the funded job, rather than
merely assuring government funds are spent for program purposes
225
only. The Court also admitted that the factor is potentially manipulable, and then offered several reasons why it believed that the factor
226
It rejected the dissent’s more
pointed toward unconstitutionality.
restrictive and formalistic interpretation of precedent, and left open
227
to future cases the task of making the standard more precise. The
opinion openly confessed that the standard is hardly one that leads to
228
self-evident line-drawing. It then firmly placed this case on one side
of the line.
But it did so in a very narrow context: the government already had
imposed viewpoint-specific limits on use of its funds. What government could not do was carry that one step further and require the recipient to adopt a policy pledging its commitment to the viewpointspecific policy the government favors. How this requirement will play
out in future cases—such as speech-based challenges to government
requirements that recipients of funding or commercial actors comply

222
223
224
225
226
227
228

133 S. Ct. 2321 (2013).
Id. at 2327 (quoting Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547
U.S. 47, 61 (2006)).
Id. at 2328.
Id. at 2329–30.
Id. at 2330.
Id.
Id.
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with nondiscrimination policies that prohibit discrimination based on
sexual orientation—remains to be seen.
One can argue that the opinion is still woefully thin on clear
markers for future cases. One can disagree about where the Court
drew the line in this case. One surely can debate whether the distinction drawn between the facts of this case and those in Rust was per229
suasive. One also can object to some of the misleadingly absolute
statements dotting the opinion that celebrate the allegedly clear prohibition of government compulsion of speech.
But the caveat-laced opinion, taken as a whole, is remarkably
pragmatic—a very welcome departure from the self-assured sermonizing of other Roberts Court First Amendment cases. Moreover, the
case “goes small” in terms of its potential clear application in future
cases. It emphasizes a question to ask—does a funding scheme (versus a direct prohibition—see Factors 7, 8 and 9 above) unnecessarily
force applicants to “pledge allegiance” in ways that go beyond the
funded job? (see Factor 13 above, on proportionality)—but leaves
open many ways for courts to answer this question.
To this provisional, hedged, and doctrinally conservative aspect of
the opinion I say, “Bravo!” and “Encore, please!” This aspect of the
case shows a much deeper understanding freedom of expression than
earlier Roberts Court cases that repress virtually all nuance and potentially hamstring government regulators seeking to limit or proscribe harmful expression in ways that make sound, contemporary
sense.
2. A Word About New Science Implications
Factors, rather than formalism, also will enable the Court to better
adapt to emerging science that is potentially relevant to First
Amendment thinking. In particular, the Court will need to consider
growing evidence of how weak our cognitive abilities may be, how
disengaged some of us are from democratic deliberations, and how
technological advances may undermine any robust sense of our analytical autonomy. No matter what theory of freedom of speech one
embraces, the scientific and social science literature presents some
very serious challenges to fundamental assumptions on which the
most widely accepted theories are based.
We have long recognized the unicorn nature of a robust marketplace of ideas that operates as a crucible that leaves “truth” as a resi-

229

I do not think it was, but no matter here.
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due.230 We also long ago categorized as mythical another creature in
231
the freedom of speech forest: the rational autonomous thinker. But
we nevertheless have found it extremely difficult to abandon either
myth completely.
Holding on to the rational thinker myth is rapidly getting harder.
New literature is displaying just how poorly we reason, in fairly predictable ways, with worrisome implications for First Amendment doc232
The literature shows how we can be moved—
trine and theory.
suckered—into choices that are not in our best interests due to cognitive weaknesses that make us extremely vulnerable to manipulation.
Moreover, these works are not political screeds but socio-biological,
neurological, and psychological investigations into human cognition
and behavior. They are attempts to know us as we are, not as we
would like to imagine ourselves. They have implications for legal
norms and principles, but they did not arise in that political valueladen context with particular policy axes to grind.
How should we reconcile the traditional freedom of speech triumphalism about individual capacity for reasoning with the emerging
evidence about human beings’ undeniable susceptibility to bad, misleading, or ideologically tilted messages, often with no awareness or
concern that we are being led astray? Rather obvious is that the
worse we are at thinking, the harder it becomes to treat us as autonomous, to reject as “paternalistic” measures that help guide us, or to
insulate us from influences that are in many ways—even in good
ways—“coercive.” Also, if social science studies indicate that we are
not seeking enlightenment from the marketplace of ideas, as much
230

231

232

See, e.g., Baker, supra note 77, at 965–66 (discussing problem with marketplace model
posed by lazy thinkers in the audience for speech); Derek E. Bambauer, Shopping Badly:
Cognitive Biases, Communications, and the Fallacy of the Marketplace of Ideas, 77 U. COLO. L.
REV. 649, 651 (2006) (critiquing the marketplace model on grounds of the many cognitive biases that undermine its assumptions); Owen M. Fiss, State Activism and State Censorship, 100 YALE L.J. 2087 (1991) (discussing market dysfunctions and possible benign
speech effects of government regulation); Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1 (critiquing the metaphor on grounds that truth is not a
natural upshot of the speech market); Sheena S. Iyengar & Mark R. Lepper, When Choice
Is Demotivating: Can One Desire Too Much of a Good Thing?, 79 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC.
PSYCHOL., 995, 996–97 (2000) (discussing how multiple choices can create effects that
can paralyze rather than liberate decision making); Troy A. Paredes, Blinded By the Light:
Information Overload and Its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417,
456–57 (2003) (discussing the difficulties even experts have in sorting out information in
the relevant marketplace of ideas).
This is a recurring theme in Critical Legal Studies work. See, e.g., MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE
TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987); ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL
STUDIES MOVEMENT (1983).
See infra text accompanying notes 237–42.
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free speech theory supposes, but rather mere distraction and often
233
crass entertainment, then we not only are cognitively weak thinkers,
but we are also not even trying to be careful thinkers in many of our
protected expression pursuits.
Lofty claims about free thinking and oppressive government thus
are in potentially fatal tension with more realistic appraisals of the average First Amendment actor and her limited capacity to sort
through data flow, commercial speech, political messages, entertainment, and other expression that receives the significant First
Amendment protection.
Even a quick peek into the burgeoning psychological and neurobiological literature on our many cognitive weaknesses, our susceptibility to seductive or selective presentation of information, and the
countless ways in which we can be “indoctrinated,” “coerced,” or
“tricked” into bending ourselves to viewpoints that the government
(among others) seeks to influence makes casual claims about our
right to be free from government compulsion seem quaint. At the same
time, it may make government interventions designed to nudge us
toward government-favored choices more worrisome.
For example, the literature arguably makes objections to government regulation aimed at guiding us through our “marketplace of
ideas” choices weaker: we need far more help than we might imagine. It also suggests that our resistance (some might say imperviousness) to abstract and statistical messages—however accurate they may
be—and our responsiveness to (some might say seduction by) vivid
and salient messages means government interventions need to lay it
on really thick, simple, and visual to even get our attention.
Thus, very graphic warnings on cigarette packages may be necessary, not unduly paternalistic, if we are serious about deterring people
234
from smoking. Mere disclosures of the calorie content of a Big Mac
may not suffice to combat the growing health crisis of obesity. We
may instead need a picture of a blind, Type II, diabetic person with a
leg amputation or severe neuropathy. Or, we may need some other
prompt to steer us to healthier choices. First Amendment doctrine
thus may need to arc its compelled speech thinking to meet specific

233

234

See, e.g., Collins & Skover, supra note 91, at 785 (“TV is the talk of our times . . . .”); Toni
M. Massaro & Robin Stryker, Freedom of Speech, Liberal Democracy, and Emerging Evidence on
Civility and Effective Democratic Engagement, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 375, 404–06 (2012) (noting, for
example, the popular observation that “we live in a vulgar world—one in which modern
mass media shifted our taste norms . . . .”).
See supra text accompanying note 181; see also Nadia N. Sawicki, Compelling Images: The
Constitutionality of Emotionally Persuasive Health Campaigns, 73 MD. L. REV. 458 (2014).
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problems, rather than intoning stale general formulas about paternalism that may block worthy and life-saving regulation.
Yet it also suggests that some government use of graphic images to
nudge us into government-endorsed behaviors may work exceptionally well, with implications for government speech that veers into propaganda or more purely ideological messaging of other kinds. Alternatively, government interventions could boomerang and produce
consequences that undermine government goals. The most we likely
can say is that free speech thinkers ought to consider this emerging
science, and assess both how it relates to our constitutional framework and how doctrine should be applied to specific speech problems.
In some ways, this newer work is simply a more sophisticated version of earlier work and case law that already recognized the ways in
which we think poorly, especially under stress. The slow march from
treating criminal syndicalism laws deferentially to demanding a very
high level of threat before verbal incitement to illegal activity can be
punished “consciously or not, recognized the risk that highly emotional times of political emergency are likely to evoke the kinds of
235
cognitive illusions that lead people to overestimate perceived risks.”
Likewise, the lukewarm protection of commercial speech is premised
in part on the recognition that consumers are “subject to pervasive
236
In other words, the notion that we are poor
cognitive illusions.”
thinkers, or that we are more socially constructed than autonomous is
hardly news.
What has changed is that the scholarly investigation into the patterns within our cognitive illusions is becoming much more sophisticated. Scholars are starting to explain more precisely how, when, and
where we are thrown off, with important implications for regulators
seeking to protect us and judges seeking to protect us from overzealous government regulators. Finally, scholars are noticing the normative (and thus theoretical) implications of these observations, in the
free speech arena and elsewhere.
Simply put, the more we know about the human brain and human
behaviors, the more we may need to adjust the law that applies to
them. First Amendment law is one such area, though it is hardly the
237
only one.

235
236
237

Paul Horwitz, Free Speech as Risk Analysis: Heuristics, Biases, and Institutions in the First
Amendment, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 36 (2003).
Id. at 49; see also Bambauer, supra note 230.
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1349 (2011).

424

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 17:2

This may not mean new government mandates are the right answer. In some cases, regulation may be the wrong answer, because it
may produce worse outcomes. It does mean that we should take the
mandate option seriously. The multiple, systematic errors that humans tend to make in thinking about problems clearly relate to federal regulatory approaches that are designed, per Executive Order
13563, to “reduce burdens and maintain flexibility and freedom of
238
choice for the public.”
If we know that humans rely on default rules, engage in procrastination, use framing devices to process information, are more inclined
to avoid loss than is reasonable, are vulnerable to social influences,
suffer from baseless optimism, use unnuanced heuristics, and let
239
emotions skew decision making, then how should government respond? If we have an aversion (or imperviousness) to abstract and
240
statistical presentations, as opposed to vivid imagery, this may affect
whether and how government should “compel speech”—for example, by forcing companies to make particular types of disclosures to
241
credit card applicants, health care consumers, and others. In other
words, a lot hinges on whether and where we really are good at thinking—as much free speech rhetoric assumes—though one of our cognitive biases seems to be an exaggerated sense that we are good at
thinking, or at least much better than average.
In the First Amendment context, these insights corrode the baseline. Ignorance may not be bliss; it may be quite injurious to our
physical health, financial security, political stability, civil liberties, and
our well-being more generally. Again, this does not answer whether government regulation of a particular form is better than leaving us to our own,
muddled-thinking devices. Our acute vulnerability to framing and heuristics, for example, can be manipulated and abused by government
242
as well as by MasterCard. It does counsel caution about close-ended
238
239

240

241

242

Exec. Order No. 13563, 3 C.F.R. 215, 216 (2011).
Id.; see also DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL (2009); DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING
FAST AND SLOW (2011); ROBERT TRIVERS, THE FOLLY OF FOOLS: THE LOGIC OF DECEIT AND
SELF-DECEPTION IN HUMAN LIFE (2011).
See Sunstein, supra note 237, at 1352–54 (stating that information that is “vivid and salient
can have a larger impact on behavior than information that is statistical and abstract”); see
also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER: THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT (2013) (arguing for more
government “nudges” such as product warnings and other disclosure rules rather than
prohibitions or prescriptions).
Id.; see also OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PSYCHOLOGY
IN CONSUMER MARKETS (2012) (discussing the implications of behavioral economics for
consumer contracts).
See generally EDWARD L. BERNAYS, CRYSTALLIZING PUBLIC OPINION (1923); EDWARD
BERNAYS, PROPAGANDA, (IG Publishing, 2005); JACQUES ELLUL, PROPAGANDA: THE
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and cross-contextual conclusions about government as freedom of
speech villain (or hero, for that matter). And it points decidedly
against the approach to freedom of speech problems that the Roberts
Court took in the three scenarios outlined above.
As we learn more about the precise nature of our cognitive weaknesses, courts will be confronted with starker choices about how—or
whether—to address them within free speech doctrine. Should government be given greater power to adopt regulations designed to
correct for our cognitive flaws? How much should the scientific evidence weigh in the free speech calculus, before the traditional objection to “paternalism” kicks in? And at what point, if ever, does the
“marketplace of ideas” metaphor finally collapse under the weight of
so much evidence that undermines its basic assumptions about rational speakers and audiences, or “truth” as its residue?
My point again is that the Court would be wise to avoid formalisms
that will make it much harder for free speech doctrine to accommodate the emerging evidence about who we really are and how we really
think. It also needs to preserve breathing room for ways in which
243
Cheery, roboth of these things may change in the years ahead.
manticized accounts of who we wish we were, or who we used to be,
will only make it harder for constitutional law to “stay real.”
G. Operationalizing the Non-Formalistic Approach – Two Helpful
Illustrations
Two elegant scholarly treatments of important free speech problems illustrate how courts might better tailor free speech analysis and
theoretical justifications to doctrinal reality. In the first, the writer
argues for above-the-line treatment of “data.” In the other, the writer
urges caution about above-the-line treatment of expert knowledge or
professional speech. The shared features of the arguments, if not

243

FORMATION OF MEN’S ATTITUDES (1965); EDWARD S. HERMAN & NOAM CHOMSKY,
MANUFACTURING CONSENT: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE MASS MEDIA (2002); FRANK
L. GOLDSTEIN, PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS: PRINCIPLES AND CASE STUDIES (1996);
WALTER LIPPMANN, PUBLIC OPINION (1930); J. MICHAEL WALLER, FIGHTING THE WAR OF
IDEAS LIKE A REAL WAR (2007).
This concern is not unique to free speech doctrine. The modern Court’s stress on historical practices as a primary tether for constitutional interpretation, as well as its preference
for formalism over balancing tests, make it especially and pervasively impervious to the
ways in which saving room for innovation matters. See Toni M. Massaro, Substantive Due
Process, Black Swans, and Innovation, 3 UTAH L. REV. 987, 987–88, 990 (2011) (discussing
the problem in the context of substantive due process doctrine); see also E. THOMAS
SULLIVAN & TONI M. MASSARO, THE ARC OF DUE PROCESS IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, 222–38 (2013).
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their specific proposed outcomes, illuminate how to analyze contemporary free speech problems like the introductory problems in a
manner that is both descriptively accurate and normatively grounded
but not rigidly formalistic.
1. “Big Data” as Speech
An important free speech line-drawing debate is being played out
now in scholarly works that address production, collection, and interpretation of huge data sets. Is this data speech? If not, when is data protected speech and what level of protection does it enjoy? Can
we live with the effects of locating data—raw or refined—
presumptively in the same free speech territory as political expression? Does the “big data” revolution, with its potential to radically alter our notions of personal privacy, change the answer? What are the
doctrinal, theoretical, and practical consequences of the answers to
all of these questions?
Jane Bambauer makes a powerful case for presumptively treating
244
data as above-the-line speech. Her article is an excellent vehicle for
demonstrating how the existing free speech framework shapes the
discussion, and is best understood as multi-factored and flexible rather than dichotomous and inflexible.
Like all arguments for expanding free speech to embrace a new
category, Bambauer invokes the normative claims that favor broader
readings of speech protection. In particular, she relies on the “thinker-based” theory of freedom of expression advanced by Seana Valen245
tine Shiffrin, which sheds helpful light on the audience or future
speaker aspect of First Amendment rules that protects expressive activity. For Bambauer, free speech is not just about the current speaker’s interests, but how one speaker’s data flow leads to another’s new
idea.
Tracking doctrine and influential analyses of doctrine, Bambauer
then posits that where First Amendment coverage is ambiguous, gov246
Regulation that is deernment motives for suppressing it matter.
signed to interfere with knowledge offends her preferred thinker244
245
246

See Bambauer, supra note 122, at 105–06 (discussing why data should not be relegated to a
lower form of protection in all cases).
See Shiffrin, supra note 39, at 283–84, 303–04 (describing the “thinker-based” theory of
freedom of expression).
Bambauer, supra note 122, at 89–91. See also Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose:
The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 414–15
(1996), for an earlier important work on the importance of government purpose in free
speech analysis.
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based theory of the First Amendment; other regulation may not. Second, Bambauer underscores doctrinal outcomes that best support
her theory as well as her specific claim for expanded protection for
data. She carefully canvasses other speech that enjoys special protection, and shows why much data deserves similar treatment, despite
concerns about invasions of individual privacy or other potential
harms that unregulated data collection, disclosure, and use regula247
tions may cause.
Unlike less prudent arguments for expanded free speech protection, Bambauer adds a crucial third step to her free speech argument:
she refuses to state the level of scrutiny that should apply to regulations of data
248
flow because “the answer will depend on context.” She also notes that data above-the-line is subject to the further qualification that all such
speech receives—for example, is it commercial speech? Is it a matter
249
of public or merely private concern? In other words, whether this
“protected” speech is really protected in a significant way from regulation depends.
This is a wise caveat that leaves substantial play in the regulatory
joints to accommodate context variable government interests in regulating data. Of course, it also leaves data (and regulators of data) in a
bit of a haze: data is above-the-line, but barely, and is not always protected. But the weakness of the proposal is also its strength. Bambauer’s argument for above-the-line scrutiny combines order and
flexibility. She proposes a thumb on the free speech scale in data
flow cases and makes a compelling case that data is presumptively expressive, not mere authorless “conduct.” Yet she expressly notes that
facts and context matter.
Although Bambauer favors a normative theory that has the capacity to contain her pro-speech recommendations, she curbs her prospeech enthusiasm. She does not dictate how the courts should treat
the dizzying array of potential applications of free speech principles
to all forms of data flow. Instead, she carefully highlights the most
important free speech questions and values at stake, then leaves the
balancing to careful, case-by-case judicial consideration, while effectively undermining reflexive arguments against her that would treat
250
data collection as less-protected “conduct.”
Surely some will critique her article for failing to offer greater
doctrinal or normative crispness to guide courts and restrain data
247
248
249
250

Bambauer, supra note 122, at 70–72.
Id. at 105.
Id.
Id.
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regulators. Yet, for the reasons offered herein, Bambauer did exactly
the right thing in sailing past the sirens calling her to the rock of
“categorical protection!” or the whirlpool of “no protection!”
Similar caution is warranted whenever one is advancing a new
claim for above-the-line treatment of expression. Again, the judicial
capacity to intelligently umpire these disputes is untested, and the
risk is always that courts will fall back onto old free speech bromides
that work best in traditional contexts rather than carefully consider
the context-sensitive nuances and potential harms of newly protected
speech. And again, courts rarely retreat: speech that attains abovethe-line status tends to keep it forever.
Bambauer’s “data as speech” problem makes clear the value of
doctrinal incrementalism and the importance of preserving room for
potentially colliding policy interests. The most serious question
about her proposal thus is not whether her incrementalism is normatively or doctrinally sensible—it is both—but whether the current
Court will display similar restraint and respect for nuance when it
confronts the looming “big data” regulatory issues in future cases.
2. Expert, Disciplinary Knowledge as Speech
A second, increasingly important line-drawing debate involves
whether and when government regulation of the circulation of expert, disciplinary knowledge violates freedom of expression. Here
again, we are of two, contradictory minds.
Free speech anxieties plainly are mobilized when the government
regulates professional or expert speech on politically charged topics—think of the controversy in California over prohibitions on ther251
apists treating minors with the “gay cure” or laws that require doctors to deliver particular messages to patients seeking lawful
252
Few people want a politically driven legislature to capabortions.
ture or control expert, professional speech in ways that distort disciplinary knowledge, however they define “distort”.
Nevertheless, government regulation of professional or expert
speech traditionally has more often been treated as a below-the-line
problem, under which content-based distinctions, speaker-based regulation, and compelled speech happen frequently, without serious
251

252

See S. 1172, 2011-2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012), available at https://leginfo.legislature.
ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201120120SB1172; Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d
1208, 1215 (9th Cir. 2013).
See Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v. Rounds, 686 F.3d
889, 892 (8th Cir. 2013); Post, supra note 183, at 948–49.
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First Amendment consternation. Moreover, few people want politically-driven, incompetent, or unscrupulous “quacks” to administer
medical treatment or deliver professional advice based on idiosyncratic or indefensible notions of best practices. They expect government to police “malpractice” and “fraud.”
In his illuminating examination of this important area of freedom
of expression, Robert Post defends the conventional approach to
regulation of expert knowledge, which permits much greater government control of “professional speech” than would be allowed for
253
Post inspeech by a professional, in a non-professional capacity.
vokes doctrine that allows such regulation, and relies upon a political
theory of free speech that comports best with this outcome. Specifically, he draws heavily on the public/private concern dichotomy of254
ten deployed in freedom of speech cases, and argues that the best
normative account of elevated speech protection is that it covers
speech that facilitates successful self-governance, which he then argues supports distinctions between professional and private expres255
sion.
Post’s argument for presumptive but not absolute government
power to regulate expert knowledge is cautious, context-sensitive, and
non-formalistic. It respects doctrine and its normative underpinnings, but avoids close-ended declarations that would foreclose courts
from making adjustments in situ.
There is again a “thumb on the scale” here in favor of regulation,
but with a theoretical premise that is sufficiently complex to capture
an enduring complexity within freedom of speech: government interventions can advance knowledge, not merely interfere with it. His
approach therefore leaves room for courts to adjust their rulings accordingly.
3. Common Insights
The Bambauer argument for expanding free speech coverage to
include data flow, and the Post argument to restrain free speech constraints on production of expert knowledge, follow quite similar and
sensible methodological steps. These shared features show the commonalities that often bind superficially contradictory approaches to
speech coverage problems.

253
254
255

POST, supra note 79, at 15.
Id.
Id. at 6.
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Both Bambauer and Post begin with a subset of speech problems
256
Both work
(with Bambauer, data; with Post, expert knowledge).
out from their conclusions to a doctrinal presumption that suits their
favored outcomes (with Bambauer, protection of data flow from government interference; with Post, protection of expert knowledge
257
from government interference).
Both worry about—though perhaps not to the same degree—the
normative implications of blurring the lines between public and private communications and between protected and unprotected com258
Both also worry about the obstacles to knowledge
munications.
that government regulation of information may impose, but under259
stand that laissez-faire responses too may thwart knowledge.
Both anticipate practical limits on their doctrinal preferences
260
Neither
(Bambauer, “context matters”; Post, “context matters”).
embraces free speech absolutism.
Finally, both arguments, for all of their elegance, inevitably raise a
question that is endemic to all non-absolutist approaches: “[w]hy
draw the protection line there, but not here?”
This last objection is legitimate, but ultimately is not enough to
justify a more absolutist approach. Bambauer’s thinker-based approach to First Amendment boundary drawing in data flow cases likely is not more useful than is Post’s political theory-based boundary
drawing in expert knowledge cases, once one moves away from the
specific cases both of them address. Bambauer likely needs to more
specifically define knowledge worth protecting, and Post likely needs
to more specifically define public purposes worth pursuing, if they
hope to assist judges in drawing future lines. As I have explained,
261
however, this is not a reason to reject either contribution. All viable
constitutional arguments must work within a common law tradition,
and thus must match the common law process itself—i.e. they should
inch out, case by case, from past decisions and adapt to new examples.
All viable free speech theories also beg important application
questions. The best of them blunt regulation and underscore the
importance of liberty norms, even when speech is disturbing or disruptive. Nevertheless, even the best of them cannot cover all of the
256
257
258
259
260
261

See supra Part II.G.1–2.
See supra text accompanying notes 245–47, 253–54.
See supra text accompanying notes 244–47, 253–54.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 248–49, 253–55.
See supra text accompanying notes 77–97.
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existing First Amendment terrain and offer a bright-line test for
where all future boundary lines should be drawn. This is why we have
theories, not one theory, that courts invoke as they traverse the vast
and bumpy doctrinal terrain. The theoretical “n” equals “more than
262
Taken together, they remind us that
two, but . . . finitely many.”
freedom of speech is an essential feature of a liberal democracy and
tends to promote a marketplace of ideas, protects speaker autonomy,
and advances truth and knowledge.
Bambauer and Post thus are on the right doctrinal track when
they underscore how much the location of speech above-the-line matters, despite the many caveats to protection that still apply up there.
They are also on the right theoretical track when they explain why
holding (or pushing) the line matters, as a normative matter, in the
areas they consider. Line-drawing doubts remain, but such doubts
are inescapable.
Finally, they deal persuasively with the doctrine we have, rather
than ignore it, and accept the mushiness of free speech principles
within that case law. Then, they wisely leave things open for future,
contextual analysis. This is how the best First Amendment arguments
can and should proceed, even though we may disagree with the ultimate success of a specific doctrinal or theoretical claim.
Neither work is flawless. For example, Post seeks to explain the
line between protected professional speech and unprotected speech
as an outgrowth of a theory of protected speech that aims primarily at
protecting speech that communicates information necessary “to en263
Yet as we have
lighten public decisionmaking in a democracy.”
seen, there are at least two problems with his explanation. First, we
may not agree that this is the primary purpose of the First Amendment. Second, we may not agree that much government regulation
of professional speech is consistent with this theory of what should be
protected speech.
Why aren’t most professional communications between a doctor
and her patient important vehicles of information? Patients use these
communications to advance their personal interests—their health—
in ways that resemble how voters use political communications to
their potential legislative representatives to advance their personal interests—including, but not limited to, their health. In both cases, the
audience has a right to receive information. Why does regulation of
262
263

Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick & Adam Frank, Shame in the Cyberkinetic Fold: Reading Silvan Tomkins, 21 CRITICAL INQUIRY 496, 511 (1995) (emphasis in original).
Post, supra note 183, at 976 (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1975)).
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the communication in one context merely facilitate “informed consent” and not in the other?
Post replies that we should worry about physician speech regulation that “does not merely compromise the ability of individual
members of the public to receive accurate information; [but] also
undermines public trust that professional physician speech will re264
flect the expertise of the ‘medical community.’” He goes on to say
that this “strips physician-patient communications of their unique authority and dependability, and . . . jeopardizes the capacity of the
medical profession to serve as a reservoir of expert knowledge that
can reliably be communicated to the public through physician265
patient disclosures.”
These are all compelling justifications for regulating professional
speech, but they are not unique. Presumably many other private actors also are reservoirs of expert knowledge, including about health.
Why should the American Medical Association or other professional
organizations stand on higher ground than these other actors, and be
more immune from government regulation (read: compulsion) of
their communications?
Post’s analysis of the medical profession’s insulation from unduly
partisan or distorted speech regulations makes perfect sense only if
one agrees that this professional speech has uniquely powerful consequences, and is governed by professional standards that may better
protect patient health than government interference will do. But the
power of medical professionals’ speech cuts in competing directions:
it justifies some governmental interference (to assure its integrity),
and makes suspect other governmental interference (to assure its in266
tegrity). In neither case does the integrity of the expert advice turn
on whether the physician is compelled to say (or not say) something
scripted by the government.
Nor is the matter resolved in either case by determining whether
the government regulation requires a form of government “ventrilo267
Many ostensibly priquism,” as some commentators have argued.
vate actors are directed by government to speak according to quite
precise government standards. Private employers may not say many
specific things without government consequences. Recipients of government grants may be obliged to post notices with governmentdrafted words. Private newspapers cannot run ads that list “Male On264
265
266
267

Id. at 979.
Id. at 979–80.
Post acknowledges this. Id. at 987.
See Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1, 49–53 (2000).
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ly” jobs. Private mental health professionals whose specialty is cognitive or “talk therapy” cannot dispense psychological advice that state
regulatory bodies deem to be malpractice. Issuers of securities must
follow extremely precise and arguably paternalistic rules regarding
disclosures about the risks of investing.
We are all, in other words, vulnerable to becoming government
sock puppets, in appropriate roles and circumstances.
This is not only true when we are paid to channel government
messages, in the more classic example of agreeing to engage in “government speech” in exchange for a government benefit. It is also
true in cases of direct regulation of our private speech, such as when
268
we are selling products, delivering medical care, or engaging in a
very wide range of speech activity that involves—implicitly or explicitly—conveying information to other people who have a need to rely
on the integrity of that information.
Nor is the compelled speech problem a simple exercise of line
drawing between commands and incentives, between controversial
and non-controversial material, or between facts and opinion. Government has many ways to influence our thinking short of direct
prohibitions or even the softer tool of selective funding. These mes269
sages typically are not content- or value-neutral ones.
As Lawrence Lessig wrote years ago, “the proscription of speech is
just one of many means to the establishment of orthodoxy—indeed,
270
perhaps the least effective way.” Government has extremely broad
271
And,
power to control its “own” information, data, and property.
when government does speak, the Court has said the First Amend272
ment does not even apply. This is so even when the message is ex268

269

270
271

272

Cf. Jennifer M. Keighley, Can You Handle the Truth? Compelled Commercial Speech and the
First Amendment, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 539, 578–85 (2012) (defending compelled disclosure of factual commercial speech, subject to certain conditions that include not spreading the government’s “normative message”).
See Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56 HASTINGS L. J. 983
(2005) (discussing the pervasiveness of government efforts to influence others, and how
it often pursues its persuasive ends non-transparently).
Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 1039 (1995).
See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Bd.
of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality
opinion).
See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009); see also Nelson Tebbe, Government Nonendorsement, 98 MINN. L. REV. 648 (2013) (critiquing Summum and noting multiple ways in which the Constitution limits government speech in ways that belie the Summum language); William Van Alstyne, The ‘Competition of the Market’: “Enter the Elephant!”
[A Reintroduction of a Most Perplexing First Amendment Conundrum] (Duke Law School Working Paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=238907 (critiquing government speech
doctrine); infra text accompanying notes 141–52 (discussing Summum).
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plicitly ideological, and not merely a message designed to improve
the integrity of discourse, promote knowledge, advance respect for
prevailing expert or scientific knowledge, or expand the marketplace
of ideas.
The public school curriculum is a particularly vivid vehicle of public values inculcation through “government speech.” The availability
of private school options mitigates the effect of public school curricula on all students, but the messages conveyed by public schools still
may influence the millions of students who attend them. Even a
home-schooling option does not mean the government has no power
over educational content in these settings: states constitutionally can
require that basic educational standards are met.
Other examples of government inculcation of thought abound,
and the line between permissible government promotion of worthy
ends and offensive, non-factual or paternalistic government coercion
is often very cloudy. Is it merely factual and non-coercive for government to require that tobacco products warn us about the health
hazards of smoking? Or is it spreading a normative message in ways
273
Should government be althat cross the First Amendment line?
lowed to require that menu labels inform us of the nutritional content of all items? Or is this an incursion into private speech that
274
Even if it does, what does this
treats patrons paternalistically?
speech have to do with public discourse? Does that matter, as Post
believes it does, to the baseline question of whether the speech deserves full First Amendment protection?
One person’s government propaganda or paternalism is another’s
sound government effort to promote sensible public policy by regulating professionals, commercial actors and others—even if it means
275
leading them (and us) by the nose to better private decisions.
Thinking about how to draw this often ideologically and scientifically
contested line matters, especially in the contemporary moment of
widespread, bipartisan distrust of government mandates and incen273
274

275

See Keighley, supra note 268, at 573 (concluding that graphic tobacco warnings cross the
line).
See Jennifer L. Pomeranz, Compelled Speech Under the Commercial Speech Doctrine: The Case of
Menu Label Laws, 12 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 159, 188–92 (2009) (arguing in favor of
menu label laws).
Of course, government can lead us by instructing us directly through its own “government speech” rather than regulating private parties’ speech. See Greene, supra note 267,
at 2 (identifying three “monopoly, coercion, or ventriloquism” concerns with government
speech, but defending strong government power to engage in government speech even
when it involves great social costs if the government is one voice among many, is noncoercive, and reveals its public source).
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tives designed to promote individual welfare. Government regulation
that constrains full expressive autonomy inevitably will continue.
The attractiveness of Post’s approach therefore is not that it solves
all problems irrefutably: it is that it helps in thinking about ways to
proceed through this gnarly thicket, rather than denying that a thicket of options exists, and it tackles concrete illustrations with uncommon doctrinal and theoretical rigor. That Post’s account also includes leap-of-faith moments in which he assumes the value of some
expression, in service of leap-of-faith, romantic theoretical assumptions about the value of freedom of speech more generally, is not a
fatal flaw. It is an inescapable feature of analysis that respects the
messy First Amendment world we have, yet also embraces the hope it
reflects.
CONCLUSION
The free speech paradox is this: we are unwilling to pitch altogether the First Amendment myths of our impressive autonomous
thinking skills and political process engagement that drive so much
of the doctrine—for what, pray tell, will we substitute for this rosy
276
But we also are unlikely to igconstruction of liberal democracy?
nore it completely because of our commitment to this rosy construction.
The First Amendment myth of the rational thinker, which the scientific literature and much common sense undermine, compels us to
take a closer look at the doctrine we have, the limits of our theories
about it, and the fissures that both display. Freedom of speech rhetoric and its mythology, more than any other constitutional rhetoric
and mythology, remind us that everything we currently believe may
be wrong. Again, the crucial constitutional leaps of faith are that
there is no such thing as a false idea, that the marketplace is the best
proving ground for politically charged thought, that we can handle
factual complexities, and that we will listen to speakers who strike us
as disgusting, threatening, stupid, biased, lazy, bloviating, craven, or
276

See Massaro & Stryker, supra note 233, at 439 (2012) (noting that “[i]t may well be . . . that
reason is developed strategically,” but that nonetheless, democracy cannot “‘hold such a
pessimistic view of the citizen and still believe in meaningful debate’” (quoting Leon
Wieseltier, The Fear of Reason, NEW REPUBLIC, July 14, 2011, at 36)); see also Larissa Barnett
Lidsky, Nobody’s Fools: The Rational Audience as First Amendment Ideal, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV.
799, 839 (2010) (recognizing the many problems with the rational audience model, yet
concluding that “[t]o reject the possibility of a rational citizenry . . . is to reject the democratic ideal”); cf. Richard Michael Fischl, The Question That Killed Critical Legal Studies, 17
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 779 (1992) (arguing that the question “what should we do instead?”
is a powerful brake on some of the critical legal studies work that rigorously critiques accepted norms and standards in conventional legal thinking).

436

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 17:2

plumb crazy. These heroic assumptions counsel many virtues, despite
their obvious descriptive flaws. The most important of these virtues is
intellectual and judicial humility.
Genuine intellectual and judicial humility, in turn, should mean
rejecting free speech formalisms, one-theory chimeras, grand doctrinal syntheses, and the farthest reaches of free speech mythology and
fantasies. The Court can, and should, heed these cautions and recalibrate its approach accordingly.
A multi-factored, pragmatic and non-formalist approach to freedom of speech best describes the free speech doctrine we have, and is
a better way to develop that doctrine going forward than is closeended formalism. It also leaves the door open to consider the rapidly
changing scientific scene that bears on individual autonomy and
cognition.

